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APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION SUEN YEK 
ABSTRACT 
The advance of 802.11 b wireless networking has been beset by inherent and in-built 
security problems. Network security tools that are freely available may intercept 
network transmissions readily and stealthily, making organisations highly vulnerable 
to attack. Therefore, it is incumbent upon defending organisations to take initiative 
and implement proactive defences against common network attacks. 
Deception is an essential element of effective security that has been widely used in 
networks to understand attack methods and intrusions. However, little thought has 
been given to the type and the effectiveness of the deception. Deceptions deployed in 
nature, the military and in cyberspace were investigated to provide an understanding 
of how deception may be used in network security. Deceptive network 
countermeasures and attacks may then be tested on a wireless honeypot as an 
investigation into the effectiveness of deceptions used in network security. 
A structured framework, that describes the type of deception and its modus operandi, 
was utilised to deploy existing honeypot technologies for intrusion detection. 
Network countermeasures and attacks were mapped to deception types in the 
framework. This enabled the honeypot to appear as a realistic network and deceive 
targets in varying deceptive conditions. The investigation was to determine if 
particular deceptive countermeasures may reduce the effectiveness of particular 
attacks. 
The effectiveness of deceptions was measured, and determined by the honeypot' s 
ability to fool the attacking tools used. This was done using brute force network 
attacks on the wireless honeypot. The attack tools provided quantifiable forensic data 
from network sniffing, scans, and probes of the wireless honeypot. The aim was to 
deceive the attack tools into believing a wireless network existed, and contained 
vulnerabilities that may be further exploited by the naive attacker. 
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The results indicated that the wireless honeypot was able to deceive wireless sniffing 
tools Kismet and Netstumbler (see section 2.12.1) into believing a wireless access 
point (AP) existed. However, network attacking tools NMAP and Nessus were not 
altogether deceived into believing a network of varying Operating System (OS) 
platforms existed within the wireless honeypot. The faked OS's on the wireless 
honeypot could not be guessed on all scans conducted by the attacking tools, which 
indicated that the deceptions deployed were not effective. 
The implications of results demonstrated how deceptions might be used in network 
defence as a means to improve organisational network security against common 
network attacks. Additionally, the results indicated which areas of wireless network 
defence would need further investigation to determine a more effective use of 
deceptions. 
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1 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
SUENYEK 
This research involves deployment of a wireless honeypot utilising a Honeyd 
honeypot and 802.11 b wireless network technology. A honeypot is a security 
resource that is used for detecting and monitoring attacker behaviour in a network 
(Spitzner, 2002a). Honeyd is a type of honeypot that uses operating system (OS) and 
network emulation to appear real to an attacker. The Honeyd will be the primary 
source for testing network attacks in the honeypot for this research. The wireless 
capabilities that will be adopted for the wireless honeypot will be the IEEE 802.11 b 
standard. This will allow the deployment of a wireless access point (AP) that will be 
used as the gateway entrance to the Honeyd virtual networks. 
The intention of the wireless honeypot is to appear deceptively as a realistic network 
of wired and wireless integrated services for various OS platforms. Scanning of 
Internet Protocol (IP) address spaces and the probing of TCP/IP ports are popular 
methods of OS fingerprinting. Their aim is to identify the platform and version of the 
OS so that an attacker may discover a specific vulnerability to exploit. 
The wireless honeypot is then an exploratory platform to investigate how deception 
may be utilised in wireless network defence. This encompasses observation of results 
from common attack tools used on the wireless honeypot. This will also allow the 
effectiveness of deceptions to be measured, and interpreted by the researcher. 
A literature review of deceptive origins and implementation is presented to identify 
how deceptions may be deployed in network security. The various implementations 
of deceptions is researched from animals, the military, and from cyber exploit of 
deceptive capabilities. A framework for deception is developed to encompass the 
deceptive possibilities examined in the literature. 
The framework for deception is used to map existing network countermeasures and 
attacks to a specific type of deception. This allows the researcher to determine how 
1 
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each deception may be deployed as a defence on the honeypot; and as a network 
attack method. A devised matrix for each countermeasure and attack aids in the 
identification of the conditions for deploying the deceptions in the form of deception 
in depth. 
Deception in depth (DiD) encompasses rings of varying deceptive strength, deployed 
on the wireless honeypot. Each ring, moving outwards from the central core, abates 
in deceptive strength. The focal point of the DiD is the wireless honeypot. The 
second ring utilises Honeyd to create a virtual network topology containing 
numerous OS and web server platforms. The third ring employs FakeAP to generate 
false 802.11 b network packets, and provide a subsequent entry-point to the Honeyd 
virtual networks. 
Additionally, a Central Logging Structure (CLS) that encompasses Honeyd log-files 
and SNORT Intrusion Detection (IDS) logs records the network activity on Honeyd. 
The CLS runs concurrently with any attacks performed on the wireless honeypot and 
is thus part of the deceptive implementation. 
Each ring in the DiD may be attacked using common network brute force tools. 
These tools include Kismet and Netstumbler that stealthily detect wireless access 
points. As well as Network Mapper (NMAP), that performs stealth TCP/IP port 
scanning; and Nessus, that forcibly probes and identifies system vulnerabilities. 
Several attacking tools are freely available for download from the World Wide Web 
(WWW). The attacking tools NMAP and Nessus are popular choices for 'script 
kiddie' attackers (Honeynet Project, 2000; Spitzner, 2003). Script kiddies are 
amateur computer hackers that typically use tools that are easy to operate and require 
little human interaction. 
There is a diverse range of resources available from the WWW that a script kiddie 
may use. Some examples of other wireless sniffing tools include Dsniff, WaveLAN, 
2 
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and AirMagnet. They are able to sniff out 802.11 b access point signals and 
configurations such as the IP, MAC, SSID (see section 2.12.1), signal strength and 
channel of the AP, using a Linux or Windows machine. 
System Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN), WebTrends Security 
Analyzer, and Argus, primarily used on Linux systems, are other examples of 
network security tools used for detecting and exploiting vulnerabilities. 
The effectiveness of deceptions used for defence on the wireless honeypot will be 
evaluated from results gathered from the outputs of the attack tools used. Kismet and 
Netstumbler will indicate if a bogus AP may be identified through wireless sniffing 
of 802.11 b packets. NMAP will scan IP blocks to enumerate OS platforms and 
running services on ports. Nessus-generated reports of attacks will indicate if a 
security warning or vulnerability may be detected on the selected IP addresses 
scanned and probed. 
The Honeyd log-files and IDS files, recorded during the same attack, is used to 
triangulate the results of the attack tool Nessus and verify if the results are accurate. 
A discussion of the results will then be used as a basis to explore possible 
explanation and implications of the results ascertained from the wireless honeypot 
experiment. 
The research aims are to investigate how deceptive strategies may be used for 
wireless network defence. The deployment of a wireless honeypot provides an 
experimental basis for testing deceptive countermeasures and attacks. The result of 
which may be beneficial for organisational understanding and implementation of 
deceptions for network security. 
3 
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1.1 Significance of Research 
Current studies and statistics show companies do not implement adequate security 
measures for protection of wireless networked resources (Barnes et al., 2002; Nanda, 
2002; Webb, 2002). Furthermore, the nature of existing 802.llb (see 2.10.1) 
protocols subject sensitive information in wireless networks to remote attacks that 
may not even be detectable. 
Results from a conventional wired honeypot experiment revealed deception to be a 
successful countermeasure to network threats generated by brute force attacks 
utilising vulnerability scanners (Gupta, 2002; Yek & Valli, 2002). The combination 
of wired and wireless services introduces new security issues. These hybrid networks 
may utilise similar deceptive countermeasures to successfully defend against 
malicious attacks (Nanda, 2002). 
The primary purpose of the research is to ascertain the effectiveness of using 
deceptions on the wireless honeypot to counter common brute force network attacks. 
The wireless honeypot deployment aims to appear and perform as a wireless 
network. The implementation of the honeypot is strengthened through the 
development and application of a deceptive framework to investigate and apply 
deceptive, defensive, or offensive mechanisms. The framework for deception is 
utilised to determine if specific deceptions are more effective against particular 
network threats. 
Investigation of deceptive implementations on the wireless honeypot aims to identify 
effective methods of deceptive network defence. Understanding how deceptions may 
be deployed, and what outcomes may be achieved, may be significant for devising 
better organisational defences. However, any small office - home office (SOHO) user 
or organisations implementing a wireless local area network (WLAN), may find the 
research significant for developing a defence for 802.11 b insecurities. 
4 
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1.2 Research Questions 
The significance of the study has outlined particular focus areas that will be 
investigated in this research. A methodological formulation of the research questions 
will provide clear goals for the researcher. The research questions for the wireless 
honeypot experiment are: 
1. Can a framework for deception be applied to common network 
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks? 
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks? 
3. Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack? 
5 
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2 CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 A Definition of Deception 
SUENYEK 
Rue (1994, p.v) provides a definition of deception that is wide in scope, area, and 
application: "[Deception is] the problematic distinction between appearance and 
reality". However, a single statement may not convey all the fundamental 
characteristics of deception. Therefore, the nature and properties of deception may be 
described as: 
[To occur] when the designs embedded in the morphology [meaning 
the form or structure] and/or behaviours of one entity defeat the 
designs embedded in the perceptual structures and/or strategies of 
another entity (ibid, 1994). 
It is essential to investigate the origins of deception and the diverse definitions that 
have since transpired. Several descriptions and classifications of deception have been 
observed and theorised by various authors that will be examined in the following 
literature review. 
2.1.1 Animal deception 
Studies by Caras (1972) and Hutchins (1980) show plant and animal organisms to be 
the earliest practitioners of deception for both defensive, and offensive means of 
survival. According to Caras "Evolutionists would insist that their colors and patterns 
are no accident; that there is some survival value in being marked the way they are" 
(1972, p.4). 
Bowyer (1982) suggests deceptive behaviour and physical distortion in various 
species are determined by physical structure and genetic makeup that has emerged 
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from a process of selection over the course of evolution, or possibly a single moment 
of mutation. Furthermore, Bowyer states: 
Any mutation that saves even one animal in 10,000 encounters of its 
species with predators will be preserved and will firmly establish 
itself in the species. It is these often almost imperceptible genetic 
advantages that explain some of the bizarre hiding and showing 
mutations that have been preserved and elaborated in nature (p.48). 
Subsequently, anecdotal research of biological case studies facilitates understanding 
and classification of deception throughout evolution. The biological evidence and 
illustrative cases will be researched to determine deceptive origins, implementation, 
and the impact of external factors in order to devise a framework for deceptive 
pathways that network countermeasures and attacks may employ. 
2.1.2 Taxonomy of deception based on biological case study 
Bowyer (1982) stipulates two levels of deception, which are dissimulation - hiding 
the real, and simulation - showing the false. The levels of deception apply to 
psychological deception employed mainly by humans, but may also be mapped to 
those physical deceptions demonstrated in animals. 
Through the structure of deception in Figure 2.1, Bowyer defines deception as "the 
advantageous distortion of perceived reality" (1982, p.47). Bowyer describes all 
deceptions to involve hiding, and is divided into three categories: masking, 
repackaging and dazzling. This is the first level of deception. A second level of 
hiding the real is showing the false: which is mimicking, inventing and decoying. 
According to Bowyer, all deceptions fall into either of these categories. 
7 
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THE STRUCTURE OF DECEPTION 
(With process defined) 
Deception 
(Distorting reality) 
DISSIMULATION Level 1 SIMULATION 
(Hiding the real) (Showing the false) 
MASKING MIMICKING 
SUENYEK 
Level 2 
Conceals one's own } Characteristic Copies another's characteristic Matches another's spectrum spectrum 
REPACKAGING 
} Characteristic 
INVENTING 
Adds new Creates new characteristic 
Subtracts old spectrum spectrum 
DAZZLING 
} 
DECOYING 
Obscures old Characteristic Creates alternative characteristic 
Adds alternative spectrum Spectrum 
(Bowyer, 1 9 82, p.6 1 )  
FIGURE 2 .  1 The structure of deception 
2.1.3 Biological examples of dissimulation - hiding the real 
Masking 
Masking is a form of hiding by blending into surroundings or seeking invisibility. 
The advantage of a masked deception allows an animal to hunt prey with as little 
possibility of being observed, or to integrate with the environment to conceal from 
potential predators. An example of masking is demonstrated by a Polar Bear's  white 
fur that blends with their habitat of snow (Polar Bears International, 2002). The 
masking aids their invisibility to hunt prey such as seals. 
Repackaging 
Hiding the real in the form of repackaging different or new attributes is the intention 
of distorting perceptions through appearing dangerous, harmless, unobvious, or 
simply conveying a particular attitude. Chameleons utilise changes in skin 
pigmentation to repackage their appearances. This is done to communicate their 
8 
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willingness to mate (PBS, n.d.), and to hide from predators such as large birds 
(Carthy, 1 972). 
Dazzling 
Dazzling is a mode of deception that is often employed when unsuccessful in 
masking or repackaging, and when the predator has recognised its prey. Hence 
dazzling is often a contingency manoeuvre to escape a predatory strike. Octopi utilise 
dazzling deceptions by expelling a smokescreen of black ink that aims to impair the 
predator' s orientation, while the animal escapes danger. 
2.1.4 Biological examples of simulation - showing the false 
Mimicking 
Mimicry is an "offensive deception" (Bowyer, 1982, p.50) employed by animals that 
actively impersonate another life form through faked behaviour or appearances, 
while concealing what is really their own. The mimicry should have bearing or 
connection to the environment, or the potential host for the true advantageous effect 
of the deceived target's  distorted perception. The Cuckoo bird employs this type of 
deception by mimicking the colour of other birds' eggs. It then abandons its own 
offspring in their nests, to be fledged by a foreign parent. 
Inventing 
Inventing an alternative reality is a deception used by animals when hiding is not 
possible, and there is no capability to mimic. An animal that utilises inventing 
deceptions accessorises its physical structure with an attribute that appears to change 
the entire reality of its appearance or actions for an intended advantage; such as to 
gather food. A bioluminescent organ that protrudes from the usually dark coloured 
Deep Sea Anglerfish invents a new reality because only the Anglerfish's organ may 
be seen in the dark. This deception is used as bait to lure small fish to the Anglerfish 
for food. 
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Decoying 
A decoyed deception is often used to distract predators from the discovered real. 
Mother ducks use themselves as decoys by feigning injury to predators such as foxes. 
This captures the attention of the predator and aims to deter them from the usually 
nearby ducklings. 
Bowyer suggests masking, repackaging and dazzling as deceptive methods employed 
to hide real characteristics. Alternatively, mimicking, inventing and decoying are 
methods to hide real characteristics from view and weaken the predator's ability to 
identify and consequently hunt prey. These deceptions may be deployed in networks 
with the similar objective of hiding real assets, while impairing the attacker's ability 
to compromise. 
2.1.5 Major types of deceptive effects sought 
Similar to Bowyer's structure of deception, Gerwehr & Glenn (2003) specify three 
deceptive effects which are sought from a deception: masking, misdirecting and 
confusing. The deceptive 'effect' refers to a "specific type of disadvantageous 
misperception the deceiver is seeking to produce in the mind of the target" (ibid, 
p.36). This is described in Table 2. 1 .  
Concealing signal 
Transmitting clear and 
unambiguous false 
1 0  
Camouflage 
Concealment 
Commingling with non-combatants 
Signature reduction 
Reducing signals, ideally to the point 
of undetectabilit 
Feint/ demonstration 
Decoy/dummy 
Disguise 
Disinformation 
Divert attention, resources awa from 
--APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION 
Raising the "noise" level 
to create uncertainty, 
paralysis, degrade perceptual 
capabilities 
SUENYEK 
real assets/activities 
Generating additional commotion, 
traffic, movement, etc. 
Shoot-and-scoot to disorient foes 
Purposeful departure from established 
pattern ( conditioning/exploit) 
Randomisation 
Create 'noise', over saturation 
un redictabilit , or the need for haste 
(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003, p.37) 
TABLE 2. 1 Major types of deceptive effects sought 
2.2 Evaluation of deceptive effects sought and the structure of 
deception 
Gerwehr & Glenn's' major types of deceptive effects sought show that masking, 
misdirecting, and confusing effects also encompass the deceptive outcomes defined 
by Bowyer. A summary of deceptive effects sought may therefore be expressed in 
Table 2.2. 
Misdirect, Mimicry, Decoy 
Attempting to blend with the 
environment without attracting 
attention. 
Luring attention by creating a 
different scenario. 
Obscuring presence with 
exa erated actions. 
TABLE 2. 2 Summary of deceptive effects sought 
Upon defining various forms of deceptions from biological instances, the purpose of 
executing a deception may be identified and further applied to any deceptive source. 
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Consequently, humans may implement deceptive effects for network security that 
may result as a mask, mimicry, or confusion. 
2.3 Levels of Deceptive Sophistication 
US National Security Research and Development organisation RAND, aims to 
improve policy and decision making through research and analysis of several 
governmental issues that include military deception. One focus area of RAND's 
research in deception is  military adaptation from plant and animal deceptive models 
and precedence (RAND, 2003). 
According to RAND (2001),  and researchers Gerwehr and Anderson (2000) 
deception may be classified into four exclusive groups: static, dynamic, adaptive and 
premeditative. Each group is representative of a level of sophistication that an 
organism may exercise over the deception, as described in Table 2 .3 .  
The deception method is in place irrespective of state, 
activit , or histor of either deceiver or tar et. 
The deception method is employed by the deceiver when 
circumstances tri er it. 
The deception method is triggered as in DYNAMIC above, 
but the method or triggering event may be modified by 
feedback (i.e., trial-and-error). 
Blending with each unique environment or adapting to each 
situation. 
Designed and implemented based on experience, knowledge 
of friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities, and moreover, 
observations about the tar et' s sensors and search strate ies. 
(Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000, p.3 ; RAND, 2001)  
TABLE 2 .  3 Deceptive levels of sophistication 
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2.3.1 Biological examples of deceptive levels of sophistication 
Static 
SUENYEK 
The colours of a Viceroy butterfly are an imitation of the poisonous Monarch 
butterfly. The Viceroy's colours are static, of which the insect does not harness any 
control (Ivyhall, n.d.). Thus, the deception remains unchanged regardless of the 
circumstance. 
Dynamic 
A dynamic deception is displayed through the Walking Stick insect's ability to 
stiffen its body, and change colour to it' s  surroundings when triggered by fear 
(Caras, 1972). 
Adaptive 
The Lacewing larvae rob the wax from an aphid' s  body to transfer onto their own, as 
a protection and disguise from predators. This deception is employed upon 
interaction with the Lacewing larvae' s  predator, and surrounding environment 
(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003). 
Premeditative 
A premeditative deception is the most advanced level of sophistication. It involves 
prior assessment of the circumstance, and results in a cognitive decision. Dolphins 
and humans are characteristic of this level of sophistication, and thus have the ability 
to implement a premeditative deception (ibid, 2003). 
2.4 Defensive and Offensive Induced Deceptions 
RAND Researchers Gerwehre & Glenn reason that a defensive or offensive 
deception is "among one of the best methods for both successfully preying and 
escaping predation" (2000, p. 1 6). This assertion holds merit, given that predators 
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often utilise offensive, deceptive resources to hunt prey. Additionally prey will seek 
defensive, deceptive measures to evade attack. 
2.5 Summary of Biological Deceptions 
The biological case studies discussed reinforce Bowyer's (1982) theory of the wide 
variety of deceptive applications designed to suit each organism's available 
resources. The classifications identified (Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000; Gerwehr & 
Glenn, 2003; RAND, 2001) support nature's almost infinite selection of deceptive 
applications. Whether fixed or flexible, physically dependent, or behaviourally 
induced, there are "many deceptive methods that may accomplish similar ends" 
(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003, p.12) This may be for both defensive and offensive 
purposes. 
Deceptions thus implicitly encompass a level of complexity that the deceptive effect 
may be exercised through. Humans however, are able to select which deceptions are 
appropriate to apply to the circumstance. Therefore, implementing a network based 
deception may require varying levels of sophistication to respond to the shifting 
intensity of attack capabilities; such as the behaviour of many modem day interactive 
attacking tools. 
2.6 External Factors 
Deceptive 'conditions' encompass a number of external factors that include the 
predator and prey (Bowyer, 1982). The implications of external factors such as the 
immediate environment, knowledge of the adversary, recent history, preconceptions, 
and warning also have significant influence upon any deception of the prey and 
predator (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003). 
In The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operation, Gerwehr and Glenn (2000) 
argue that in-depth operational deception should adapt to the urban environment 
through synergistic strategies that are aimed to reduce opponent strength, and expose 
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weakness. Additionally, the nature of the urban terrain, whether friendly or 
dangerous, may affect the forces and processes of the battle where "Something 
similar might be said of deception" (ibid, p.iii). 
Gerwehr and Glenn (2000) infer that an effective, operational deception should 
consider the combination of social and cultural conditions, physical infrastructures, 
and all other unique characteristics of the surroundings. An integration of this 
knowledge facilitates informed judgements, and decisions about deceptive actions. 
Consequently, circumstance becomes a fundamental element of the deception. 
Further research (ibid, 2003) has shown effective use of deception in urban conflict 
to be valuable for offensive deception, defensive deception, and intelligence 
gathering purposes. 
2.6.1 The adversary and perception 
The adversary, who is the intended target of the deception, is able to utilise its own 
distinctive recognition and interpretation of sensory stimuli ( eyes, ears, smell etc) 
that is employed in a strategy of perception. This may include inch-by-inch scrutiny, 
quick scans, random walks, or spiral searches (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003; RAND, 
2001). 
The assessment or perception of the adversary is formulated by insight, intuition, or 
knowledge of the prey, which prompts an action. Thus, the deceiver must be aware 
of such capabilities to be able to implement a deception that contends with those 
adversarial tools of perception. Humans are akin to animals in making decisions that 
affect survival (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003). 
Decision makers rely upon their assessment of other actors' interests, 
intentions, and capabilities, as well as an assessment of the 
environment or context within which the action takes place ... 
[Hence,] It is incumbent upon decision makers to form accurate 
perceptions (ibid, 2000, p.17). 
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Implications of the adversary, referred to as the 'attacker' (see section 2.9), in 
network security are similar to biological cases. The attacker's ability is considered 
when deploying the deception. If the attacker is unskilled, such as a script kiddie (see 
section 2.9.1), then the victim needs to become aware of the attacking tools and 
methods typically adopted by a script kiddie. Therefore, this research will adapt 
deceptive countermeasures that are able to contend with this attacker's common 
choice of method and skill. 
2. 7 Military and Human Adaptation of Deception 
Gerwehr and Glenn (2003) state: 
The unforgiving nature of natural selection, combined with a truly 
staggering prevalence of deception, strongly supports the argument that 
causing an adversary's perception to be inaccurate (i.e. degrading their 
situational awareness) is of enormous value in virtually any setting or 
type of conflict (p.12). 
In this instance, the inaccuracy of perception is the result of deceptive capability. 
Defence and intelligence communities recognise the significance of biological 
deception throughout evolution. Subsequently, tactical planning of offensive and 
defensive strategies have been derived from animal deception (2000). RAND (2001) 
further supports mapping of animal biology to the military domain as highly useful 
for gaining analytical perspectives. 
2. 7.1 Military Definition of Deception 
A definition of deception by the Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military 
Deception cited in Gerwehr & Glenn (2003) states deception: 
[To be defined] as those actions executed to deliberately mislead 
relevant decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, 
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intentions, and operations, thereby causing the relevant decision 
maker to take specific actions that will contribute to the 
accomplishment of the friendly mission (p.1 5). 
DECEIVER 
Friendly forces 
Means of deception: 
friendly action 
Deception conveys: 
false friendly capabilities, 
intentions, operations 
TARGET 
Relevant decision makers 
Effect of deception: 
response to falsehood 
Effect of response: 
net gain for DECEIVER 
SUENYEK 
(Gerwehr & Glenn, 2003, p.15) 
FIGURE 2. 2 Deception: The joint definition 
The military definition illustrated in Figure 2.2 is depicted as a relationship that 
involves the deceiver utilising a means of deception to convey a false message to the 
reciprocating target. According to Gerwehr & Glenn (2003), the response to 
falsehood as an effect of deception is a "deliberately induced misperception" (p. 1 5) 
resulting in an outcome as an advantageous gain for the deceiver. 
The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) publish the 
Air and Space Power Mentoring Guide, in which the essay Principles of War 
emphatically states "The principle of the offensive suggests that offensive action, or 
maintaining the initiative, is the most effective and decisive way to pursue and to 
attain a clearly defined goal" (1 997, p.60). 
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The essay then further explains premeditated defence as the primary strategy in war. 
An offensive posture is empowered by resourceful and proactive conduct aimed to 
achieve results and to subdue the adversary. A defensive posture should only be a 
transient interval until an offensive posture may be restored. "No matter what the 
level of war, the side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces the 
enemy to react rather than to act" (ibid, 1 997, p.60). The paper firmly maintains that 
an offensive stance is indispensable to ensure triumph over the adversary. 
The paper also takes into consideration active and passive states within defence 
operations. This implies that defence may strategically utilise proactive execution, or 
yield submissive responses. 
In a proactive situation, "deception is also a valuable mechanism of intelligence­
gathering" (Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000, p.2). Despite complications in managing 
deception, "there is little doubt that when employed successfully, deception is among 
the most powerful instruments of conflict" (ibid, p.2). 
Moreover, deception is not a single tool :  it is a diverse array of 
measures, which may be employed individually or in depth, alone or 
in concert with more traditional defensive measures, as simple 
schemes or complex ruses . . .  There may thus be a synergistic effect 
in the use of deception alongside other defensive measures (ibid, 
p.2). 
Figure 2.3 illustrates deception in depth utilising layered rings that express an array 
of deceptive measures that aim to strengthen the defence. Deception in depth 
demonstrates separate rings of deception and a reflected outcome for an attack on 
each ring. The central core embraces the most effective deception and is thus 
positioned closest to the protected asset. As the rings progress outward, the strength 
of the deception abates, where the peripheral is the most vulnerable of rings. 
The rings of deception are implemented with careful consideration of the adversary. 
Different adversaries penetrate, and fall prey to deceptions in numerous ways 
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depending upon their knowledge, experience, capabilities, determination, and 
resources (ibid, 2000). 
Deception 1 
Deception 2 
Deception 3 
Deception 4 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
Attack 4 
Attack 3 
Attack 2 
Attack 1 
(Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000, p.2) 
FIGURE 2. 3 Deception in depth 
2.8 Evolving Deception in Cyberspace 
Humans are excellent wielders of deception, even within cyberspace. This is 
supported by the many deceptions implemented by humans including propaganda, 
spamming, spoofing, viruses, steganography, virtual reality, encryption, and lying 
(Hutchinson & Warren, 2002). Hence, the virtual world of anonymity yields almost 
unrecognisable, yet successful deceptions. 
However, "as humans become almost totally dependent on digital data for their 
personal operational lives the consequences of deception increase exponentially" 
(ibid, 2002, p.5). Consequently, there imparts a necessity to protect one's own assets 
whether it is a person's identity, or data, in cyberspace. This may be achieved 
1 9  
---APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION SUENYEK 
through employing deceptive strategies learned from the observation of deceptions 
used in the animal kingdom, and the military. 
2.9 Identifying the Enemy in Network Security 
In animal deception, the enemy of the prey is the adversary. In network deception 
and defence, the enemy has many names such as 'hacker' or 'cracker' . Computer 
hackers may be defined as "an individual who experiments with the limitations of 
systems for intellectual curiosity or sheer pleasure" (Schneier, 2000, p.43). Ethical 
computer hackers aim to improve network security by breaking-in through network 
penetration testing (Hartley, 2003). Hackers, who penetrate computer systems for 
disruptive reasons, are branded as crackers. In this research, the computer cracker is 
the enemy, and will be referred to as the 'attacker'. 
Attackers use network penetration techniques to find vulnerable services running on 
particular TCP/IP ports of a computer, so that they may compromise the system. Any 
response from a TCP/IP port indicates that the particular port is active, and running a 
service that is potentially exploitable by an attacker. OS detection through TCP/IP 
fingerprinting determines the version number, and platform of the OS, so that a 
particular vulnerability of the service on the TCP/IP port may be identified for that 
version. 
Network scanning of whole IP blocks or addresses, may be performed by automated 
tools such as NMAP, which stands for 'Network Mapper' (Fyodor, 2003b). NMAP 
determines OS fingerprints through a series of TCP/IP handshakes on TCP/IP ports 
that make the target respond in a particular way. 
Automated tools such as Nessus (Deraison, 2003a) perform OS detection by probing 
specified targets through banner grabbing and port scanning. Nessus performs 
vulnerability testing by directing known attacks on a service that is found running on 
a TCP /IP port. 
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OS fingerprinting is "extremely valuable" (Insecure.org, 200 3, <][2) for exploiting 
computer vulnerabilities. This is because an attacker may then modify and tailor an 
attack to the particular type of OS the victim is using, and thus achieving a greater 
disruptive outcome. Therefore, understanding the methods used for remote OS 
detection are a necessity for testing and improving network defence (Insecure.org, 
200 3). 
2.9.1 Script kiddies 
The term ' script kiddie' is a derogatory term for the unsophisticated, though highly 
dangerous, attacker (Search Security, 200 3;  Spitzner, 2002a, 2002b). Script kiddies 
are typically immature attackers that use crude methods of compromise. They 
predominantly aim to penetrate a system and gain root (highest administrative level) 
access (Honeynet Project, 2000 ). A common technique is launching a buffer 
overflow attack that may be targeted to a discovered OS vulnerability, enumerated 
through port scanning. 
A common modus operandi undertaken by a script kiddie is to scan random networks 
to find a target. Once found, the target is exploited using automated tools that require 
little understanding of their technical functionality (Honeynet Project, 2000 ; 
Spitzner, 200 3). These automated tools typically include NMAP and Nessus, among 
other network scanning tools. Some script kiddies aim for the quantity of attacks 
achieved (Search Security, 200 3). This type of behaviour may multiply the threat for 
damage that is caused by an unskilled attacker. 
Although there are no definitive figures representing the number of script kiddie 
attacks, Chamales and Klinger from the IEEE (see section 2.10 .1) communications 
society rationalise that as much as 9 5% of the attacking community are in the 
amateur script kiddie category (200 3 ,  p.3). Additionally, Spitzner (2002b), and 
Cohen (1 9 9 9 )  also support that a vast number of attacks are executed by script 
kiddies. Consequently, the concern for potential damage from a script kiddie is 
emphasised, due to their numbers and their use of automated tools. 
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Therefore, the primary attack methods employed in this research will be based on 
tools typically used by a script kiddie. This includes the network security tools 
NMAP and Nessus. This will allow the researcher to investigate results of the attack 
tools used that would be relevant and meaningful to organisations defending against 
script kiddie attacks. 
2.10 Comparing Wired and Wireless Networks 
2.10.1 Wireless Network Protocols and Origin 
Traditional wired networks have utilised cables and Ethernet connections for 
communication of physically linked devices. Typical entry to the World Wide Web 
(WWW) and private networks are via a discrete route. The arrival of wireless 
networks encompasses a new-network structure that replaces wired media with high 
frequency electromagnetic waves for data transmission across an air space. 
In 1980 The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) released the 
802.1 lx suite of standards that specify the frequency range for wireless data 
communications, and is currently the most prevalent standard for implementing 
wireless local area networks (WLANs) (Montcalm, 2002). 
The IEEE 802.1 lx suite currently comprises the 802.11 a and 802.11 b standards. 
However, standards for 802.1 lg and 802.1 li products, with more security, are under 
development. The IEEE specifies the frequency range 2.4GHz in the Industrial, 
Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band for the use of 802.11 b compliant devices. At 
present, 802.1 lb compliant products, also known as Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) 
products, dominate the wireless market (Schoeneck, 2003). 
The 2.4GHz band is shared by 802.1 lb (Wi-Fi) devices, microwave ovens, various 
cordless phones, and some fluorescent lights. However, one major disruptor of 
802.11 b are Bluetooth enabled devices. Bluetooth is the name given to a technology 
that uses small chips to connect short-range radio links that also utilises the 2.4GHz, 
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ISM band. Several other wireless standards that may prevail in future are HiperLan-2 
and 5-Unified Protocol (5-UP) (Nanda, 2002). 
The deployment of WLANs differs largely from their wired counterpart's, mainly to 
accommodate user mobility of wireless communications. The principal devices 
required for wireless network communications are access points (AP), an antenna, 
and wireless enabled clients. 
APs plug into a power supply and connect to the wired LAN to function as a root 
( central connecting) AP, or bridge connecting services to a wireless client. APs 
broadcast beacons with signal strength and data capabilities depending on the type, 
and strength of the antenna attached to the AP. Wireless clients such as laptops, or 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) affixed with an antenna, and suitable network 
hardware, may then communicate with the AP through wireless packet exchange in 
the form of beacons. 
Users may gain access to wireless networks provided the wireless client is within the 
coverage area surrounding the AP, and the signal is strong enough to support 
communication. Wireless connectivity generally ranges from 10-300m from the 
beaconing AP, and with connection of a antenna this range may extend to 24kms 
(Barnes et al., 2002). However, this is largely dependent on the signal strength of the 
antenna. 
2.10.2 Future corporate wireless environment 
According to Barnes et al. (2002), the corporate wireless environment will revolve 
around three predominant application solutions: mobile messaging, mobile 
office/corporate groupware and telepresence. These are described below with 
explanation of some possible security drawbacks. 
23 
--APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION SUEN YEK 
Mobile messaging involves the extension of electronic mail to any wireless user 
located within the internal corporate (wireless) messaging network environment. 
Consequently, unintended wireless recipients may intercept confidential mail. 
Outside wireless clients will also request equal access to the restricted corporate 
services. These include the database servers, application servers, information and 
news servers, directory services, travel and expense services, file synchronisations, 
Intranet server browsing, and file transfers services. Therefore, providing the remote 
user with the same localised access to the corporate wireless resources also opens 
doorways for unintended recipients to retrieve confidential data. 
Further to the wireless mobile office, increasingly integrated wireless-networking 
technologies could unveil a revolution of interaction and communication between 
people and data stores (ibid, 2002). The potential for universally accepted and 
implicitly trusted wireless solutions, used in almost every context, is an optimism 
held by many. However, the studies conducted by the Gartner Group also highlight 
the growing concern of exploit of the corporate wireless environment: 
• By the end of 2003, nearly 35% - 40% of cellular-based wireless traffic will 
be data 
• By 2005, 50% of Fortune 100 companies will have deployed wireless LANs 
(0.7 probability) 
• By 2010, the majority of Fortune 2000 companies will have deployed 
wireless LANs (0.6 probability) 
(ibid, 2002, p.4) 
Additionally, the anticipated future wireless cost trends, illustrated in Figure 2.4 
indicate rapid decreases in the cost per user in wireless LANs, which is highly 
contrasted to marginal drops in wired LANs. Thus, the potential for wireless exploit 
may also increase with the growth of WLAN adoption. 
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FIGURE 2. 4 Anticipated wireless cost trends 
Though WLANs are not likely to completely substitute conventional wired LANs 
(Nanda, 2002), WLAN solutions provide a means for wireless clients to interface 
with wired LAN resources. The resulting hybrid networks allow interaction between 
wired and wireless clients, currently utilised effectively in several academic, 
corporate and home environments (Barnes et al., 2002; Nanda, 2002). 
2.11 Reasons for Adoption of Wireless 
"Wireless and mobile technologies are vital for the real-time enterprise" (Dulany, 
2002, <jJ:3). Accompanied by exempt licence costs for bandwidth use in the wireless 
frequency bands, the exponential growth (Barnes et al., 2002; Trilling, 2003) of 
WLANs may be attributable to many factors (Barnes et al., 2002; Dulany, 2002; 
Nanda, 2002) that are described below. 
With the absence of wires, WLANs are cheaper and often more convenient to 
implement. Limitations of fixed network APs are alleviated as wireless network 
expansion and upgrades are more easily accomplished than their wired equivalent. 
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The evolution of more powerful and compact wireless network components will see 
continued demand of more tightly integrated application support, and communication 
environments by consumers (Barnes et al., 2002, p.4). These will support greater 
access speeds, communication capabilities, and versatility of portable information 
appliances. Wireless information resources create greater portability through 
increased roaming capabilities, and facilitate increased work production with current 
throughput of 1 lMbps and emergent standards such as 802.1 lg allowing 54Mbps. 
"Today's wireless solutions offer flexibility, performance, and proven solutions that 
promise increased productivity and potential reductions of long-term capital and 
management costs associated with network deployments" (ibid, 2002, p.9). 
Thus companies capitalising on the benefits of wireless mobility, in combination 
with increased development of wireless applications, assume significant risks 
pertaining to security and reliability, and the increased potential for malicious client 
activity (Barnes et al., 2002; Nanda, 2002; Webb, 2002; Wright, 2003). 
2.12 Weakness and Threats to Wireless 
A number of studies (Barnes et al., 2002; Liu, 2003; Nanda, 2002; Trilling, 2003; 
Webb, 2002; Wright, 2003) show that many companies lack properly implemented 
security over 802.11 b wireless networks. Many physical aspects of wireless 
technology and the infrastructure used, in addition to exposed encryption, and 
authentication flaws further augment the threat to wireless networks (Schoeneck, 
2003). The following is a description of various wireless security weaknesses that 
may be considered. 
2.12.1 Discovering wireless network vulnerabilities 
"Internet protocols are publicly posted for scrutiny by the entire Internet community" 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003, p.403). Similarly Nanda (2002) states "of late there have 
been several articles in the press regarding weaknesses in 802.11 WLANs." 
Therefore, weaknesses may be rapidly discovered and published on the WWW and 
any person may utilise such knowledge to seek out, and infiltrate vulnerable 
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networks. For every 1 million systems an attacker scans, 10 000 may be 
compromised (Spitzner, 200 3). Randomness of attacking tools and the attacker' s  
ability to relentlessly change and improve have become dangerously threatening to 
wired and wireless networks alike (ibid, 200 3, p.29). 
Spitzner claims declined network security is largely attributed to the availability, and 
growing trend of more powerful, fully automated attacking tools (200 3 ). This is 
because script kiddies or unskilled attackers may easily operate many of these 
attacking tools. They may also be retrieved easily from the WWW and yield little 
understanding of how the software functions. 
Wardriving 
The term 'wardriving' is modem day network reconnaissance utilised by experts and 
novices alike to discover wireless networks (Montcalm, 2002; Nanda, 2002). 
Wardriving exposes WLANs usually by driving by metropolitan areas. This may be 
done with approximate speeds of up to 90 km an hour, and by operating a wireless 
client such as a laptop or PDA. 
Conventional wired network scanning is performed by enumerating TCP/IP ports 
and similarly, the same criteria may be applied to wardriving (Montcalm, 2002). 
Additionally, stealth scanning of wireless traffic may be achieved by using packet­
sniffing software such as Kismet (Kershaw, 200 3), Netstumbler (Milner, 2002) and 
Ethereal (Combs, 200 3) to capture wireless traffic. 
Nanda (2002) surmised that in 60 % of cases, "security has proven to be absolutely 
none". In Manhattan, the Bay Area, and New England over 1000 WLANs have been 
exposed open to intruders (2002). Studies conducted by Webb (2002) revealed up to 
50 % of Perth city WLANs deployed were significantly insecure. It was also found 
that in many these cases, management were unaware of the security consequences 
(ibid, 2002). 
Additionally, access to networks as far as 40 kms away may be achieved by using 
powerful antennas such as yagi, which is not overly expensive (Nanda, 2002). This is 
indicative of the easy ability to detect distant WLANs and execute attacks remotely. 
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Compromising a WLAN may be achieved by disrupting signals through a 'man in 
the middle' (M-in-M) attack. This is where the attacker is positioned somewhere 
between the AP and transmitting range of intended wireless clients. Intercepted and 
disrupted signals from a M-in-M may relay false information, or devices may be 
burned out, or damaged. Additionally WLANs offering Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) allow use of the network connection by rogue wireless clients 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). 
Access Point (AP) structure 
One fundamental wireless security concern is the nature of the existing wireless 
setup. APs may be typically positioned in locations that are ideal for maximised data 
transmission, and user mobility. However, because APs may be probed by any client 
within reach of the network' s  electromagnetic radio frequency (RF) range, this 
creates a physically unbounded entry point that is attractive for launching attacks 
(Liu, 2003). Additionally, WLAN APs that are deployed behind conventional 
firewalls are more appealing for launching attacks on the internal network (ibid, 
2003). 
Radio Frequency (RF) deviation 
Data communication is achieved by electrical signals transmitted over the network 
medium. Traditional wired networks bind data signals into the physical confines of 
copper or optic cables, as example. Thus, data interception on the cable requires 
access to the company router, and is restricted to the physical limitations of the cable. 
Wireless data communications transmit electrical signals via RF waves, which freely 
traverse the open space to any node within a connectable distance from the 
transmitting AP. In contrast to controlled wired perimeters, RF signals are able to 
penetrate through many furnishings, floors, ceilings, walls, and even reach outside 
areas of the transmitting building. This may result in RF data transmission to 
unsolicited recipients in any location accessible by the RF waves (Nanda, 2002). 
The Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP) 
Maintaining authenticity, integrity, and availability is another key security concern in 
WLANs. The IEEE 802. 1 1  b standard specifies two types of authentication methods 
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required for participation in a WLAN: open key and shared key. Both may optionally 
utilise wired equivalent privacy (WEP) encryption. Each client is set to the 
corresponding authentication method of the AP it wants to associate with. 
Open key authentication is the default method, which allows a client to associate 
with the AP without necessarily supplying the correct WEP key, and performs the 
entire authentication in clear text. Similarly, in shared key authentication the AP 
sends a clear text challenge passage that the client then returns encrypted with the 
correct WEP key. Both are insecure (Fennelly, 2001; Nanda, 2002) as an intruder 
may either attain the plain text challenge, and the encrypted text to decipher the key 
in the case of shared key; or illegitimately authenticate to an AP, sidestepping the 
need for a WEP key in the case of open key. 
WEP uses Ron's Code 4, known as the RC4 symmetric stream cipher that supports a 
variable length key of 64 bits. The RC4 algorithm was invented by Ron Rivest of 
RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) Security Inc, and is used as the standard 802.1 1 b 
WLAN encryption protocol. Symmetric keys use the same key and algorithm for 
both the encryption and decryption of data. The original design goals ofWEP were: 
• To prevent unauthorised users lacking the correct WEP key from gaining 
access control to the network 
• To protect WLAN data streams by encrypting them and allowing decryption 
only by users with the correct WEP key 
(Nanda, 2002, p.2) 
The WEP protocol is widely known to be insecure, and is publicly posted on the 
WWW to be "riddled with architectural flaws" (ibid, 2002, p.4). Researchers Fluhrer, 
Mantin, and Shamir published the paper Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling 
Algorithm of RC4 in which the researchers confirm RC4 is "completely insecure in a 
common mode of operation which is used in the widely deployed [WEP] protocol" 
(Fluher, Mantin, & Shamir, 2001 ,  <J[ l ). 
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WEP utilises an initialisation vector (IV) that is generated every time a packet is sent 
or received via the Wi-Fi client. The IV has a maximum of 2 to the 24 bits long, 
starting from 0, and incrementing by a value of 1 each time. Thus when the 
maximum of 2 to the 24 IVs is reached, it will have to restart at O (Fluher et al., 
2001). 
Referred to as the FMS attack, the paper explains how knowledge of the IV and the 
first output byte reveal information about the key bytes. Subsequently, decryption of 
captured packets became much easier after the paper was released (Nanda, 2002). 
Furthermore, Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) state that the likely cause for deficient use 
of the WEP protocol is largely due to administrative difficulties in the configuration 
and management of encryption. Additionally, surveys reveal that WEP has been 
disabled in up to 85% of wireless installations. Pfleeger and Pfleeger also state that 
"even when encryption is used, the design of the encryption solution sometimes 
makes it easy to crack" (2003, p.401). 
Service Set Identifier (SSID) 
All packets sent by APs and WLAN clients contain the Service Set Identifier (SSID), 
which is a rudimentary naming scheme that functions to logically segment networks, 
and manage access control. SSIDs are not typically used as a network securing 
mechanism, and should not be as APs are, by default, set to broadcast their SSID in 
all beacons. An SSID may be guessed easily because they are often unassigned or set 
to manufacturer default values (Nanda, 2002). An intruder could therefore ascertain 
company SSIDs via social engineering means, or simply sniffing packets and 
identifying the SSID in the packet payload, as it is often not encrypted. 
Internet Protocol (IP) address spoofing 
Similar to wired networks, wireless networks are also vulnerable to IP address 
spoofing attacks where an attacker sends packets to the destination from an arbitrary 
source IP address. Response packets are sent to the spoofed IP address and the 
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identity of the real provoking IP is never disclosed. This method of attack may be 
exploited in cases where the perpetrator wishes to send numerous probing packets 
but does not wish to raise suspicion by disclosing the solitary perpetrating IP address. 
Therefore, the victim's  intrusion detection or packet sniffing tools may fail to detect 
a trend in port scans as malicious client activity. 
Media Access Control (MAC) address spoofing 
The Media Access Control (MAC) address is a physical, network identifier number 
allocated to hardware vendors for installation onto wired and wireless Network 
Interface Cards (NIC). All genuine MAC addresses are globally unique for each 
LAN based device and may be used for authentication for granting users various 
levels of network and system privileges. 802. 1 1 b wireless networks also utilise MAC 
addresses for client tracking and authentication. 
In nearly all 802. 1 1  b wireless NICs, the MAC address value may be modified to a 
random number using vendor-supplied drivers, open-source drivers or various 
application programming frameworks (Wright, 2003). 
Amongst several publicly posted articles on the WWW, Wright (2003) demonstrates 
the ease of changing a MAC address using the ifconfig command, or by executing a 
short C program using Linux open source drivers. Alternatively, the applet in the 
network control panel of a Windows OS may also permit changes to the MAC 
address properties. 
Depending on their skill level, an attacker may spoof a MAC address to masquerade 
or hide their presence on the network. Or, they may falsely appear to be a valid MAC 
address that is authorised by the network and AP, and consequently circumvent 
access control lists or escalate network privileges (ibid, 2003). 
3 1  
APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION SUEN YEK 
Obfuscating network presence may be utilised to launch brute force attacks on a 
system by generating random MAC addresses for malicious packets. Though this is 
often used to evade intrusion detection systems, a honeypot is able to overcome the 
failed IDS detection, as all packets are rendered suspicious. 
An attacker may bypass access control lists by obtaining a registered network MAC 
address simply by passively monitoring network traffic. In addition to gathering a 
valid list of MAC addresses from packet headers, which are broadcast in the open 
when wireless clients communicate with APs. 
Because MAC addresses are constantly broadcast in plain text in the header of 
wireless packets, the crude acquisition and manipulation of MAC data is hence far 
more common than on regular wired networks (Nanda, 2002; Wright, 2003). 
Successful MAC address spoofs may grant the intruder unauthorised access to 
control mechanisms that provide launching points for Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks, and advertise fallacious services to wireless clients (Wright, 2003). Thus, the 
propensity for significant WLAN network destruction through MAC address 
spoofing is high. 
2.12.2 Penetration testing of networks and OS fingerprinting 
OS fingerprinting is the technique for distinguishing the operating system of a host 
through its network stack (layer 3 of the OSI model). Typical OS fingerprinting tools 
probe for the known differing characteristics among OS's through identifying 
features found in the probes of open TCP/IP ports (Beck, 2001; Fyodor, 2003a). 
OS fingerprinting tools such as NMAP and Xprobe (Y arochkin & Arkin, 2003) are 
designed to connect with the network layer, layer 3 of the Open Systems 
Interconnect model (OSI), and therefore communicate using a sequence of TCP/IP 
handshakes each time a connection is attempted on a port. Each OS's TCP/IP stack 
responds to a handshake in its own unique way, which is how NMAP uses OS 
fingerprinting to identify a particular OS. 
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OS fingerprinting is an effective technique for enumerating a network as it gives 
insight into the specific OS platform and version number. Once the OS architecture 
is identified, a vulnerability scanner such as Nessus may be used to exploit any OS 
weaknesses. The Nessus network vulnerability scanner will forcibly probe each 
TCP/IP port on an OS for any known security weakness, and report findings to the 
Nessus client (a Graphical User Interface). An unsophisticated attacker would then 
investigate on the WWW a method to exploit the OS weaknesses found by Nessus, 
with buffer overflow attacks. 
2.13 Deception as a Network Countermeasure 
For the scope of this research, networks aim to defend against script kiddies, as they 
are the primary attackers. Countering network tools that these attackers use in the 
electronic environment requires a deceptive system that is able to mimic actual 
systems and networks. Thus, a network that acts real, aims to distort appearances by 
hiding the real assets, and showing false values. 
One of the first publications of organisational, electronic adaptation of deception is 
Bill Cheswick's An Evening with Berferd: In Which a Cracker is Lured. Endured. 
and Studied (1992). Cheswick described how deploying deceptive strategies in a 
faked networked environment was valuable in learning the tactics and location of the 
attacker, and eventually reported the attacker to authorities. 
2.13.1 The Deception ToolKit (DTK) 
In 1997, Fred Cohen released the first open source honeypot solution known as the 
Deception ToolKit (DTK) on the WWW. Cohen's DTK is an effective tool for 
countering attacks by enabling customisable PERL script files to simulate behaviours 
of existing OS's. The system appears populated with known vulnerabilities that may 
be exploitable by attackers. 
The DTK gives the victim the advantage of early warning of an intrusion or attack, 
while the attacker consumes time and effort to penetrate the deceptive OS's. The 
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gathered evidence of all attacker activity 1s recorded in the DTK's logfiles. 
Therefore, tracking the attacker' s  activities allows the victim to identify the 
vulnerability the attacker is targeting, and the tools that are being used. The victim 
may then respond to the attacks with necessary actions. These actions may include 
disabling or patching vulnerable services, and notifying the appropriate authorities. 
Cohen (1 999) rationalises that increased organisational use and acceptance of the 
DTK is likely to separate many of the less sophisticated attackers commonly known 
as script kiddies, from the more advanced attackers. This is because of the efforts and 
resources taken to compromise such deceptive systems. Consequently, the deceptive 
ability of the DTK distracts attackers from the real assets and exhausts the attackers' 
resources on the faked system. 
2.13.2 Honeypot solutions 
BackOfficer friendly 
In 1 998 the 'Cult of the Dead Cow' (cDc) community designed BackOfficer Friendly 
(BOF) to combat the Back Orifice Trojan on UDP port 3 1 337. BOF is a honeypot 
that also generates faked replies when a connection is made by an attacker to a 
specific port on the computer, running the services Telnet, FTP, SMTP, POP3, or 
IMAP2. BOF pretends to open the connection, while it logs the activity on the port, 
generates an alert to the victim, and then closes the connection on that port. 
Specter 
Specter is a commercially supported, production honeypot (see section 2. 1 3 .3) that 
encompasses greater functionality and capabilities than BOF. It requires low 
interaction, is easy to deploy, simple to maintain, and is low in risk. 
Specter is able to emulate 1 of 1 3  different OS vulnerabilities at the application level 
by providing application banners, and has extensive alerting and logging capabilities. 
Small modifications on the Specter honeypot solution allow it to appear more 
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realistic and hence it is slightly more interactive than BOF. An alerting function also 
allows a system administrator to be contacted in real time. The information gathered 
by Specter is limited; however it is ideal for confusing or wasting time for an attacker 
(ibid, 2003). 
Honeyd 
The Honeyd incorporates the use of "Blackhole monitoring" (ibid, 2003, p.144), 
which is the technique of monitoring and collecting data from entire network blocks 
for analysis. Honeyd can successfully emulate hundreds of OS's at the application 
and TCP/IP network stack level. Honeyd is also able to detect, capture, alert, and 
monitor networks of millions of systems through real-time interaction with the 
attacker using customised services. 
Honeyd can actively simulate a whole network and sub network topologies. This 
simulation may be achieved by instructing a daemon to route packets to nodes, 
decrementing the Time to Live (TTL), showing attributes of packet loss, latency, and 
Internet Control Messaging Protocol (ICMP) replies, thus performing as real network 
packets traversing a network. Furthermore, Honeyd utilises a 'personality engine' 
(Provos, 2003) to process network packet content such as stack behaviour of 
fingerprinting formats of the virtual OS. 
Address Resolution Protocol in Honeyd (ARPD), is a service that runs in 
combination with Honeyd. When a connection request is made on an IP address, 
Hone yd searches for the OS bound to that IP space in its configuration file. If there is 
no assigned OS to the requested IP, then ARPD assigns the default OS. The default 
OS is any OS that the researcher wishes to bind to all unassigned IP addresses within 
Honeyd' s network. 
Primarily designed for UNIX, Honeyd is relatively easy to install and configure and 
is ideal for research. It may gather Internet trends of worm activity, exploit tools, and 
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automated attacks (Spitzner, 2003). Honeyd is thus an appropriate honeypot for 
investigating script kiddie attacks and attacking methods. 
ManTrap 
ManTrap is another commercial honeypot that does not emulate single services but 
entire OS's and can create up to 4 virtual OS's. ManTrap incorporates extensive 
administrative control, data capturing capabilities, and can simulate production 
applications such as a DNS, web server, or database. A master OS monitors and 
controls the attacker through mirrored partitions residing in cage-like environments, 
where attackers are not able to exit and attack the host OS. 
Honeynets 
The honeynet is often the most difficult to deploy and maintain because it is a true 
production system placed and monitored from behind a firewall, primarily deployed 
for research into attacking tools and tactics. The extreme high interaction is due to 
complete OS's in multiple honeypots deployed within a highly controlled network. 
Hence, the honeynet is able to capture all activity, and decreases risk by containing 
the attacker's activities. One major benefit of a honeynet is that newly discovered 
risks may be addressed before the technologies are deployed in real production 
environments (ibid, 2003). 
2.13.3 Honeypot technology for intrusion detection 
"A honeypot is a security resource whose value is in being probed, attacked, or 
compromised" (Spitzner, 2003, p.3). A honeypot's prime stratagem encompasses the 
use of deception to either mitigate risks through detecting attacks in the form of 
production honeypots; or gain knowledge of the hacking communities' tools and 
tactics in the form of research honeypots. 
Lance Spitzner, founder of the Honeynet project vigorously advocates for the use of 
honeypot technology as it gives victims control and greater understanding of hacker 
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activity (2003). A greater ability to identify, detect or capture the attacker is decided 
by the type of honeypot constructed and its deployment (ibid, 2003). This is 
analogous to the deceptive lessons of animals as the effective implementation of the 
honeypot deception may be produced from clear deceptive goals, knowledge of the 
adversary, and the environmental circumstances. 
Results from a recent study (Yek & Valli, 2002) showed a research honeypot 
deployed in a wired network environment effectively deceived popular brute force 
attacking tools Nessus and NMAP. The honeypot in this study utilised Cohen's DTK 
as the deceptive tool. The honeypot was attacked and, buffer overflows were 
manually counted and cross-evaluated with Nessus reports to provide evidence of 
effective deception against a would-be attacker. 
Benefits of production honeypots 
Production honeypots are useful when deployed to detect and report on abnormal 
network activity. Network traffic is not usually configured to be directed through a 
honeypot. This configuration may reduce the problem of false positives and 
consequently, the only packets sent to the honeypot have no purposeful function 
except harm. 
The "valuable information" (Spitzner, 2003, p.59) collected and aggregated may 
identify a scan, probe or attack. The information may then be used to establish trend 
analysis and statistical modelling of targeted ports, services and protocols used. This 
aids in detecting and researching attacks and attack methods. More importantly, this 
identifies an organisation's exposed vulnerabilities that an attacker may be targeting. 
Thus a return on investment through definitive results and minimal cost provide 
incentive for honeypot use in deceptive environments to protect assets (ibid, 2003). 
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Benefits of research honeypots 
Many lessons may be learnt from the deployment of research honeypots, which do 
not aid to reduce risk to organisations. Rather, research honeypots gather information 
that may be applied to improve prevention, detection, and reaction to attacks (200 3). 
Research honeypots are able to capture extensive forensic data of attacks and the 
attack method used by the enemy (Honeypots Net, 200 3). This is essential as "the 
greatest challenges the security community faces is lack of information of the 
enemy" (Spitzner & Roesch, 200 1 ,  <_[23 ). 
The intelligence gathering function of a research honeypot aids to uncover vital 
information that may be used to improve network security for organisations (ibid, 
200 1  ). The information gathered includes whom the threat is, and thus identifies if 
the attacker is a script kiddie, an activist group of hackers, or a single highly skilled 
hacker. Knowing who the attacker is may also help the victim determine why they 
are attacking. A script kiddie is typically a "bored [ and] lonely teenager" (Search 
Security, 200 3, <_[2) intending to compromise as many systems as possible using 
simple to operate, automated tools (Honeynet Project, 2000 ). An activist group or 
skilled hacker may wish to use complex and strategic methods to perform a specific 
purpose, such as a political message, on a single organisation (Spitzner, 2002b). 
Depending on the skill level of the attacker and their intentions, many methods or 
tools may be adopted to execute an attack. A research honeypot is an "excellent tool 
for capturing automated attacks" (Spitzner & Roesch, 200 1 , <_[24). As automated 
attacks target whole network blocks or blocks of IP addresses, the honeypot will 
capture all the attacks and identify evident trails of an automated tool. This may then 
be examined to discover how the automated tool was used for exploit. 
Attack intelligence gathered through research honeypots, are regarded as a "critical 
asset" (ibid, 200 1, <_[23). Spitzner and Roesch assert that the ability to identify and 
understand an attack is the best method to defeat the attack (200 1 ). Furthermore, 
research honeypots provide the ability to discover and investigate diverse attacks and 
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attack methods. This information then becomes vital to the understanding and 
improvement of security measures used in organisations. 
Risks of honeypots 
Risks however may arise if the honeypot is programmed incorrectly often due to 
human error. These errors then allow an attacker to compromise the honeypot itself. 
The resulting danger is the attacker may gain entry into and damage the protected 
network, or use the compromised honeypot to conduct third party attacks. Therefore, 
the honeypot should aim to control the attacker within the monitored environment of 
the honeypot (Spitzner, 2003). 
While a honeypot gains value when it is exploited, if attackers intentionally or 
unintentionally circumvent the honeypot, then a compromise in the real system may 
not be detected or recorded. Alternatively, attackers may recognise the DTK or other 
honeypot signatures through techniques such as OS fingerprinting. Managing system 
updates and checking for weaknesses, helps prevent compromise of the honeypot. 
"Threats are always adapting and changing - and so will honeypots." (ibid, 2003, 
p.111 ). The revolution of the WWW and technology has fashioned changes in the 
new-networked environment. Operational WLANs are growing and hence a 
transition from wired deceptive honeypots to wireless deceptive honeypots is widely 
anticipated. 
2.13.4 Wireless honeypots 
The need to deploy wireless honeypots has become apparent due to the recent 
popularity of wireless networks (Lemos, 2002). In the article Catching wireless 
hackers in the act, Spitzner states "It is important to see how the bad guys are 
breaking into systems using not just wired networks, but wireless networks as well" 
(2002, <[2). On June 15, 2001, US research and engineering organisation Science 
Applications International Corp (SAIC) implemented an operational wireless 
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research honeypot designed to investigate wireless attack methods through 
observation. 
Additionally the Wireless Information Security Experiment (WISE) has deployed an 
802. l l b  wireless network in an undisclosed location in Washington DC, entirely for 
research purposes. The WISE wireless research honeypot employs five Cisco APs, a 
small number of computers running vulnerable services for added appeal to hackers, 
with two high-gain, omni-directional antennas, for widespread coverage. Network 
packets are passively logged on a customised Intrusion Detection System (IDS), in 
addition to a back end logging host for traffic generated to and from APs (Poulsen, 
2002). 
The SAIC wireless honeypot has not revealed any nefarious activity other than single 
ping sweeps and unsuccessful attempts to surf the WWW. However, the WISE 
wireless honeypot is expected to have Internet connectivity in the near future that 
will present a consent-to-monitor banner to allow legal observation of Internet 
utilisation via the wireless honeypotted network. As there is no real productive use of 
either wireless honeypots other than to research emerging wireless tools and tactics, 
all network activity is closely examined (ibid, 2002). 
In addition to the same motivations for deploying a research honeypot, a wireless 
honeypot will thus enable the security community to investigate the wireless 
attacking tools and techniques that are being used by attackers (Schoeneck, 2003). 
2.13.5 Legal issues pertaining to honeypots 
The arising legal challenges of honeypots could restrain the effective use of these 
deceptive defence mechanisms owing to strict regulations of the country the 
honeypot is being deployed in (Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000; Spitzner, 2003). 
Spitzner (2003) specifies three possible legal issues arising from the deployed use of 
honeypots: privacy and entrapment of the attacker, and civil liability of the victim. 
The legality of actions may be subject to the nature of the information that is 
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collected and what is intended to be done with it, "similarly, what intruders [ or 
attackers] do while on your honeypot may expose you to certain legal troubles" (ibid, 
2003, p.368). 
Therefore, certain information about the activities of the unauthorised attacker may 
not be captured rightfully by the victim's honeypot and thus unlawful handling or 
dissemination of that information may result in an invasion of privacy on the 
attacker' s  part. Alternatively, an attacker may argue the honeypot to be entrapment, 
designed to persuade the attacker to carry out a criminal activity that the attacker 
otherwise would not have committed given the honeypot was not deployed. 
Equally significant is the concern of the victim's civil liability, should the attacker 
launch third party attacks from the victim's  compromised honeypot. Similarly, the 
compromised honeypot may be used to store contraband, such as stolen credit card 
numbers, or pilfered or prohibited software, which may be difficult if not impossible 
to defend against in court. 
However, each country's own legal statutes, regulations, and case laws 
independently state the legalities of deployed honeypots. Additionally, organisational 
policies within regulated industries or governments should provide individual 
guidelines and procedures for honeypot deployment whereby violations of internal 
policies or breaches of contracts may be handled in isolation. 
2.14 Other Integrated Security Mechanisms within Network Security 
Honeypots are security solutions that operate as deceptive defence systems. Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and packet sniffers are additional network 
security mechanisms. For the purpose of this research, an NIDS will function as a 
logging tool that will produce forensic evidence of intrusions and attacks on the 
deceptive wireless honeypot. 
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Intrusions may be defined as "an unauthorised usage of or misuse of a computer 
system" (Ptacek & Newsham, 1998, 12). A network intrusion system (NIDS or IDS) 
is a security technology that passively monitors network activity and attempts to 
identify and isolate 'intrusions' against computer systems and alert unauthorised 
activity (Ptacek & Newsham, 1998; Spitzner, 2003). 
Figure 2.5 illustrates a wired network topology in which the attacker typically utilises 
the Internet as a means to reach the corporate router and access the internal Ethernet 
connection where a corporate end system may be compromised. However, residing 
transparently on the corporate Ethernet is also an NIDS network monitor. The NIDS 
may be set in a promiscuous mode to collect all packets and is thus passively 
'sniffing' packets 
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FIGURE 2. 5 Example network topology using a passive monitor 
The NIDS operates unobtrusively on the network causing no disruption or 
degradation of network performance. Thus, an NIDS is difficult to evade as all 
packets traversing the network media are monitored transparently (Ptacek & 
Newsham, 1998). 
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NIDS' s are able to gather forensic verification of network activity that may identify 
the origins of attacks, and may render attackers accountable, or deter them (ibid, 
1 998). Identified attacks may be examined at the network packet level through a 
process of analysis and verification of protocols, and extracting the relevant 
information. An NIDS will also detect known signatures that may signify erroneous 
activity or suspicious packet payloads. 
Drawbacks of a NIDS are that frequent updated signatures by the system 
administrator, are necessary to enable the NIDS to detect malicious packets. 
However, new attacks and evasion methods to circumvent NIDS detection, that 
contain unidentified signatures, are constantly being developed (Spitzner, 2003). 
Additionally, the data collection may appear voluminous. However, this may be 
managed through a comprehensive system of data mining. 
2.14.1 Packet sniffers 
Packet sniffers passively collect and analyse network packets on a wired or wireless 
medium. Packet sniffers are transparent to the network, and they do not have alerting 
functionality. Many packet sniffers are open source, and therefore differ m 
capabilities. SNORT (Caswell & Roesch, 2002) and AirSNORT (Hegerle & 
Bruestle, 2002) are common packet sniffers that passively capture network traffic at 
the TCP/IP level. This data traffic identifies information such as the source and 
destination IP address, MAC address and port number, the time and date, in addition 
to the specific protocol used. This information is useful in determining what attacks 
are being executed and what they are targeting. 
2.15 Review of the Literature on Deception, Honeypots, and 802.llb. 
Deception may be expressed as a deliberate and/or fortuitous distortion of a 
perceived reality. Evidence suggests that deception forms a major part of biological 
existence and thus survival. This was found from the literature of deceptions used by 
animals (Bowyer, 1 982; Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000; RAND, 2001). 
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The characteristics of deception may be combined into a framework that 
demonstrates a decomposition of deceptive possibilities, encompassing a defensive 
or offensive posture. Both defences and offences may implement an actively or 
passively executed deception. Additionally, a static, dynamic, adaptive, or 
premeditative level of sophistication may implement a masked, misleading, or 
confusing effect. 
A generalised framework that embraces all the identified deceptive possibilities may 
then be applied to any object seeking to implement any of the deceptive effects (see 
section 3.2 for framework). Network defences may utilise the same deceptive 
characteristics to create a systematic method for deploying a deceptive defence. 
Investigation of deceptions may be tested on a wireless honeypot. Honeypots have 
demonstrated themselves to be valuable research tools for discovering and 
understanding attacking methods. A honeypots primarily uses deception to appear 
and perform as a real network. It may emulate OS platforms, services on TCP/IP 
ports, application level banners, and whole network topologies, depending on its 
configuration. 
Contemporary networks may now utilise wireless resources to expand data 
communication capabilities. These include the deployment of access points, 
antennas, and the use of wireless clients. The common 802.11 b standard used 
however, has been demonstrated to have several architectural flaws that may allow 
compromise of devices utilising the standard. 
Therefore, a wireless honeypot may be deployed to investigate the effectiveness of 
deceptive network countermeasures against common network attacks. 
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3 CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
SUENYEK 
The research focus questions formulated from the literature review require an 
experimental approach to both support propositions, and demonstrate intended or 
expected responses. Figure 3.1 demonstrates a hierarchy of research functions that 
express a modelled sequence of experimental processes based on Sarantakos' (1998) 
and Davis' (1997a) steps of experimental research. 
Analysis and 
Interpretation 
Data Collection 
Research Design - Selection of subjects and 
arrangement of experimental conditions 
rvariablesl 
Framework for Methods - relationships between variables, 
reliability, and validity 
Research Model - Tools to gather empirical evidence [experimental] 
Epistemological View - Empiricist and Positivist 
Methodology - Use of paradigms [Quantitative and Qualitative methods] 
FIGURE 3. 1 Sequence of experimental processes 
3.1 .1 Epistemology 
At the base of the pyramid is the epistemological stance which are the "views about 
one's own knowledge and learning [or] views about the nature of discovery and 
knowledge in the scientific community" (Elby & Lising, n.d., 13). According to 
Dolhenty (2003 ), individuals utilise senses and perception to fashion concepts and 
ideas that form a reality; and knowledge is attained by the affirmation or denial of an 
interpretive judgement about reality. Furthermore Pollock, (cited in Chesnevar, 
Maguitman, & Loui, 2000) maintains that epistemology involves the acquisition of 
reasons for supporting arguments. 
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Knowledge may be defined as the accumulation of a body of facts (Clarke, 200 1 ), 
and a comparatively abstract description of truth is characterised by judgements 
about reality (Dolhenty, 200 3). Thus, the formulation of knowledge and truth 
develop the philosophical and conceptual foundations for observing and interpreting 
reality, and accordingly characterises the research methodology. 
The epistemological views of the researcher agree with the preceding depiction of 
reality, and thus consider knowledge and truth to be observable phenomenon that 
may be used to draw conclusions. Therefore, this experimental research will be based 
on observable outcomes that will answer the research questions: 
1. Can a framework for deception be applied to common network 
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks? 
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks? 
3 .  Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by  the type of attack? 
3.1.2 Paradigms 
There are many epistemological views that draw parallels from several schools of 
thought. The epistemic views of empiricism and positivism reinforce the 
experimental nature of the research questions. The collected propositions in each 
epistemic view including beliefs, values, and techniques (Kuhn, 1 9 70 cited in 
Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 )  form paradigms of established explanations of how the world is 
perceived (Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 ). Thus the epistemological view determines the set of 
paradigms employed, and the paradigm in turn should be in context of the 
methodology (ibid, 1 9 9 8 ). 
3.1.3 Empiricism and positivism 
Empirical epistemology relies on the principle that knowledge is derived from 
observed or experimental observations (Philosophical Society, n.d. ; Trochim, 2002). 
A positivist view is found on rules and procedures for the observation and 
measurement of data (Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 ). The positive paradigm originates from 
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scientific laws that are typically deductive through a process of abstraction to 
concretisation, and are explained through universal causal laws (ibid, 1998). 
Though there are several branches of positivism, which include logical positivism, 
neopositivism, and methodological positivism, a comprehensive depiction of the 
positivist paradigm distinguishes reality as: 
Everything that can be perceived through the senses . . .  is objective, 
rests on order, is governed by strict, natural and unchangeable laws, 
and can be realised through experience (ibid, 1998, p.36). 
Thus, empiricist and positive epistemic views of knowledge and truth advocate 
observed and measured actions as a medium for researching scientific hypothesis in 
experimental conditions. Furthermore, the positivist paradigm applies formally 
defined methods incorporating concepts of measurement, validity, threats to validity 
(external, internal, construct, statistical conclusion), and reliability (Thomsen, n.d.) 
that are used in a methodological process in the research to establish the cause-and­
effect relationships (Davis, 1997b ). 
Other epistemological views embracing similar philosophies and ideologies from 
Philosophical Society (n.d.) include rationalism where reason and intuition are 
independent of experience; pragmatism where truth is the subject of experimentation; 
and conversely, realism views knowledge and truth as attainable attributes from 
experiencing the actual 'form' of the subject in query. 
Alternatively, paradigms that deviate from a positivist theoretical direction mainly 
involve interpretive or naturalistic values. The interpretivist approach argues that 
various factors that are difficult to isolate and control create flawed assumptions, 
which result in prejudiced observations. Consequently multiple interpretations of the 
same phenomena emerge and truth becomes unattainable (Sarantakos, 1998) 
Branches of the interpretivist discipline include phenomenology, ethnography, 
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hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and sociolinguistics and are often adapted to social 
research involving human behaviour. 
3.1.4 Views adopted by the researcher 
The positivist paradigm defends investigation of experimental outcomes as truthful, 
and may thus be objectively analysed to derive deductive inferences. Therefore, 
positivism will be adopted as the primary view for the experimental research. 
Interpretive views will be adopted subsequent to the data collection to allow the 
researcher to rationalise conclusions that may be interpreted from the data. 
3.1.5 Quantitative and qualitative paradigms 
Experimental outcomes of empirical observation and measurement give nse to 
further principles pertaining to the data collection and analysis in the form of the 
quantitative paradigm. The quantitative paradigm is based on positivist philosophy 
where the natural world is governed by fixed laws that are empirically observed 
(ibid, 1 998). Quantitative research aims to determine and quantify relationships 
between variables through descriptive or experimental methods (Hopkins, 2000). 
As the research has been determined as experimental, the quantitative methods 
employed will aim to ascertain the relationship between an independent variable (IV) 
and dependent variable (DV). The research questions hypothesis that direct 
manipulation of the IV - the honeypot, causes the changes in the DV's - the 
resulting deceptions; and not other erroneous variables (Davis, 1 997b ). Furthermore, 
the experimental research will aim to eliminate alternative variables (ibid, 1 997b ). 
Studying the relationship between variables involves taking a quantitative 
measurement, performing some changes, and taking the measurement again. This 
process of iterative intervention is known as repeated measures and will be used in 
the experiment to determine the causality of the relationship between the IV and 
DV' s (ibid, 2000). Tools that may be used for interpretation of quantitative, 
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statistical data are usually mean, median, mode, frequencies and regression analysis. 
Quantitative research then leads to deductive theories. 
Upon experimental execution of the IV and DV's, deductions from the outcomes 
may then be interpreted. Hence, an associated qualitative paradigm will be fostered 
as a supplement to quantitative research. Qualitative analysis involves the discovery 
of themes and patterns within the data and is typically exploratory and descriptive. 
The qualitative paradigm may also be based on positivistic views that the data is true 
given the explicitly stated experimental conditions and limitations. 
3.1.6 Methodology 
The methodology encompasses the design process and the use of methods which will 
both be determined and justified by the principles of empiricism and positivism, and 
established through the doctrines of the researcher's favoured epistemology (Crotty, 
1 998). Therefore, the methodology translates guidelines for the research practice 
based on paradigmatic assertions about reality. 
An empirical investigation is the pnmary data gathering tool arrived through 
observation and has been thought arguably to constitute the epistemology for 
understanding experience (Willemsen, 1974). Moreover the research strategy for 
empirical observation typically employs correlational, field-descriptive (applying 
correlation methods), or experimental techniques summarised in brief from (Huck & 
Cormier, 1996; Willemsen, 1 974). 
Correlational investigation 
Correlational investigation measures variables against pre-existing traits in order to 
ascertain relationships between variables, drawing its distinction from measuring 
variables that are caused by manipulation of the researcher. Correlational studies 
determine the existence of a relationship and the nature of that relationship by 
examining both the variables simultaneously in addition to the strength of the 
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relationship. Correlations may be established as a high-high, low-low case; a high­
low, low-high case; or with little systematic tendency. 
Field studies 
Field studies utilise settings where "behaviours of interest naturally occur" 
(Willemsen, 1 974, p.34), given a laboratory environment may be too artificial and 
stifle 'normal' ,  or 'typical' activity. A field study researcher would elect a 
complementary landscape for the study and consider a narrative description and 
interpretation of the setting and circumstances. 
Experimental studies 
Using experimental strategies the researcher isolates, manipulates, and controls 
variables relating to behaviours or experience pertaining to the researched 
phenomena. 
3.1. 7 Research method used for the conduct of research 
Empirical observation may engage a combination of the above research strategies to 
optimise results for conducting the research, and as a process of operationalising the 
research questions. 
Thus the research methodology for this research will predominantly encompass 
experimental strategies as the principal implementation of empirical and positivist 
epistemology, and through the observation and measurement of regulated variables. 
Therefore the independent variable (IV) controlled by the researcher will be tested 
with dependent variables (DV), that are products of the direct manipulation of the IV. 
A correlational investigation will ascertain the presence of relationships between 
variables so that a cause-effect association may be tested to verify results. A field 
study on the other hand will offset the artificial composition of the experiment by 
allowing the researcher to assimilate an archetypal environment to execute the 
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experiment. This is because a completely contained wireless network environment 
would be unachievable by the researcher. 
An underlying positivist paradigm will then direct the structure and process of the 
framework of methods within the experimental implementation. 
3.1.8 Framework for methods 
Research methods are the tools or instruments of data generation and analysis that 
are employed to accumulate empirical evidence, and are invoked from the 
underpinning precepts of the major elements of the methodology (Crotty, 1 998; 
Sarantakos, 1 998). Hence empirical and positivist, experimental methods are 
designed in a specifically defined and detailed framework. 
3.2 Framework for Deception 
The empirical nature of the research will utilise the anecdotal investigations of 
deceptive origins and implementation as the experimental variables to conceive a 
framework for the research. Thus, the conceptual framework for methods will be the 
foundation of the experiment, and applying the established methodologies formerly 
described will answer the research focus questions: 
1 .  Can a framework for deception be applied to 
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks? 
common network 
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks? 
3 .  Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of  attack? 
Therefore, collating the deceptive characteristics suggested in the literature, a 
framework for deception may be constructed to encompass all the previous 
mentioned categories of deception examined in the form of an attack tree (Schneier, 
2000). 
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The framework for deception is the conceptual basis from which to implement the 
research design of the testable experimental conditions. The framework will also be 
used to identify the mapping of network countermeasures and attacks to deceptions 
that will be deployed on the wireless honeypot. 
The research design (see chapter 4) will depict how each experimental variable will 
be mapped to a type of deception from the framework. The experimental 
implementation will identify the type of deceptions (DV's) to be deployed as a 
network countermeasure or attack; and the outcomes of deceptions on the wireless 
honeypot (IV). Therefore the following arrangement and execution of the 
experimental variables will guide the execution of the experiment (Sarantakos, 
1 998). 
Figure 3 .2 characterises the framework for deception from an offensive or defensive 
stance for a single deception. Both account for active and passive states that may 
implement a static, dynamic, adaptive, or premeditative level of sophistication and 
resulting in a masked, misleading, or confusing effect. A single deception may 
assimilate one or many deceptive pathways. 
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I Static I Dynamic I 
Mask, Mask, 
Mislead or Mislead or 
Confuse Confuse 
SUEN YEK 
OFFENSIVE OR 
DEFENSVE 
DECEPTION 
I 
Active Passive 
Adaptive I Premeditative I I Static I Dynamic 
Mask, Mask, Mask, Mask, 
Mislead or Mislead or Mislead or Mislead or 
Confuse Confuse Confuse Confuse 
FIGURE 3. 2 Framework for deception 
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4 CHAPTER 4 - RESEARCH DESIGN 
SUENYEK 
The aim of the research is to measure the outcomes of deceptive capabilities against 
brute force attacks so that results may be examined using a systematic approach that 
either supports or nullifies arguments pertaining to the research questions: 
1. Can a framework for deception be applied to common network 
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks? 
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks? 
3. Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack? 
Upon definition of the underlying methodology for the research questions, a research 
design may be devised. The research design will encompass two major phases. The 
first will describe the logical and technical implementations of the hardware and 
software used in the experiment. The second phase will define each experimental 
variable in varying deceptive conditions thus describing how they may be deployed 
in the wireless honeypot. 
This research involves constructing and deploying an integrated wired and wireless 
honeypot utilising deceptive mechanisms that encompasses a fake access point, 
Honeyd and the Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The deceptive wireless honeypot 
will be deployed in the form of deception in depth. 
4.1 Logical and Technical Implementation 
4.1.1 Logical structure of the deployed deceptive wireless honeypot 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the logical deployment of the deceptive wireless honeypot 
through the rings of deception in depth. A fake access point utilising FakeAP is 
situated on the peripheral as ring 3 as it is the most static and transparent of the 
deceptions. The Honeyd virtual networks encircle the honeypot asset within the 
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second ring of the deception given that Honeyd implements variable network level 
deception that will sustain the majority of the deceptive network attacks. The 
honeypot asset is located centrally (ring 1 )  where only strategically targeted 
deceptive attacks will be able to penetrate. 
The Honeyd logs and SNORT (Caswell & Roesch, 2002) Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) will form the central logging structure (CLS). The aim of the CLS will be to 
log and record all wireless traffic to the honeypot to verify the results of the attack 
tools used. This will detect network activity such as scans and probes from the 
attacking machine; however, from the victim's  perspective. 
FIGURE 4. 1 Applying the wireless honeypot to deception in depth 
4.1.2 Ring 3 FakeAP 
Access points are used as gateways to bridge to the private wireless network. There 
may be several configurations for an access point depending on the role of the AP 
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gateway within the network. FakeAP is software that may be used to simulate many 
access points. 
APs transmit 802 . 1 1 b data packets containing the IP of the access point gateway, 
configurations, and possible information about the connecting wireless network. 
Thus, an AP is often sniffed by an attacker to gain further access to exploit network 
resources situated behind the AP (Spitzner & Roesch, 200 1 ). 
FakeAP changes configurable parameters through the command iwconfig. The 
behaviour, signal strength, and data contained in beaconed packets are dependent on 
the configuration of iwconfig parameters. Hence, the way in which FakeAP is set up 
will determine the strength of the ring 3 deception. 
The synopsis for the iwconfig interface in Linux appears below (Tourrilhes, 1 996). 
Table 4. 1 identifies and describes the function of each of the iwconfig parameters 
that will be utilised in the deceptive wireless honeypot. 
SYNOPSIS 
iwconfig [interface] 
iwconfig interface [essid X] [nwid N] [freq F] 
[channel C ]  [ sens S ]  [mode M] 
[ap A] [nick N] [rate R] [rts RT] 
[frag FT] [ txpower T]  [enc E]  
[key K] [power P]  [retry R]  
[commit] 
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Domain identifier or network name 
assigned as the name of the AP, which 
also specifies the cells that are part of 
the same virtual network 
SUENYEK 
Name of AP - "WinNT4 
Web AP" 
Creates logical wireless networks that "WinNT4 Web AP" 
are used to differentiate and identify 
nodes that belon to the same cell 
Frequency is set in GHz and the 
channel is a number. Regulations 
control the number of channels 
available and usable frequencies. 
Sensitivity threshold for the lowest 
signal level to attempt packet 
reception and used to avoid 
background noise measured in dBm 
Operating mode of the device 
depending on network topology: 
• Ad-hoc - 1 cell & 1 AP 
• Managed - many cells roam 
with many APs 
• Master - node acts as AP 
• Repeater - node forwards 
ackets 
802. 1 1  b wireless default is 
2.4GHz. 
The channel will switch 
between numbers 1 - 1 1 
The lowest threshold for 
which the channel is not 
considered busy and the 
handover threshold 
maintaining association 
with the access point -
80dBm 
Managed mode will reflect 
the virtual networks 
created by honeyd 
Forces the card to pre-register with the Will be set to "true" 
AP. when connection is too low 
wireless cards will attempt to connect 
to the strongest signals beaconed from 
an AP 
The speed at which bits are 1 1  Mb 
transmitted over the medium used for 
cards that su ort multi le bit rates 
TABLE 4. 1 FakeAP parameters used for the wireless honeypot 
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Proposed attacks on ring 3 
The role of the ring 3 deception is to produce an access point gateway for attackers to 
discover ingress to the private wireless network via the IP of the FakeAP. Wireless 
sniffing tools such as Kismet (Kershaw, 2003), and Netstumbler (Milner, 2002) 
identify the presence of APs, and any AP related parameters that are instructed by 
iwconfig. Subsequently, the attacker advances to the next level of deception, which 
are the virtual wired and wireless networks within Honeyd. 
4.1 .3 Ring 2 Honeyd 
The Honeyd is configured to appear as a wired network containing web servers and 
client workstations that bridge added wireless services. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
course of logical network routes deployed through the Honeyd virtual networks. A 
router typically interfaces outside Internet connections with the internal network that 
is segmented to form various operating environments 
Honeyd aims to ascertain the attacker' s  objectives and resources by mimicking 
legitimate services via direct manipulation of the network stack of the designated 
operating system (OS). Therefore, the configurations for Honeyd involve 
reproducing the TCP/IP handshake sequence for OS matches, packet latency, packet 
loss and traceroute functions with the intention of appearing realistic. Table 4.2 
outlines the technical implementation of each of the selected Honeyd operating 
platforms for the deceptive wireless honeypot. 
Proposed attacks on ring 2 
When an intruder ascertains the IP address of the AP gateway, further probing will 
identify network IP addresses that are really the Honeyd virtual networks. Each 
wired and wireless network topology emulates an operating system "personality" 
(Provos, 2003) that is allocated through the researcher' s  preference. However, each 
selected OS personality must be a precise match of an NMAP or Xprobe prescribed 
OS signature for the reason that Honeyd functions by simulating connections made at 
the network level (TCP, IP, UDP, and ICMP). 
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Honeyd was designed to only provide network level interaction due to combat 
popular network security scanning tools such as NMAP (Conry-Murray, 200 1 ;  
Fratto, 2003; Noordergraaf, 2002) that utilises TCP/IP handshakes at the network 
level, to administer connections. NMAP enumerates network information such as the 
OS type and version, opened or blocked TCP/IP ports, in addition to active services 
(Fyodor, 2003a). Thus, relayed packets from the network level give substantive 
information that denotes consequent OS vulnerabilities and possible exploitive 
opportunities for the attacker. 
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• 
Wireless 
Client 
Wireless 
Client 
Win NT4 
AP Bridge 
Workstation 
Workstation 
Novell Server 
1 0.3. 1 . 1 8  
Workstation 
SUEN YEK 
CISCO H b/Switch 
10.3 1 . 1 2  
Win 98 
Workstation 
• 
Win 98 
Workstation 
G 
Workstation 
AIX Server 
1 0.3 
Workstation 
FREE BSD Serve.�- �  
1 0.3. 1 . 1 6  
SOLARIS Server 
1 0.3. 1 . 1 7  
Workstation 
Workstation 
FIGURE 4. 2 Logical configuration of the Honeyd virtual networks 
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3com Office Connect Router 10.3.1. 1 .1  TCP 80 - HTTP 
8 10  TCP 1 39 - NetBIOS reset 
TCP 137 - NetBIOS-ns 
Set default UDP action 
reset 
UDP 137 - NetBIOS-ns Set router uid 32767 gid 
UDP 135 - MS Exchange 32767 
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 10.3.1.12 No ports open 
Telnet 
11.2 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-ST ABLE 10.3.1.13 No ports open 
Set default TCP action 
reset 
10.3.1. 1 4  TCP 25 - SMTP Set default TCP action 
TCP 80 - HTTP Web reset 
TCP 21 - FTP FTP 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-ST ABLE 10.3.1. 1 5  TCP 80 - HTTP Web Set default TCP action 
reset 
FreeBSD 2. 7 /SP ARC or NFR 10.3.1.16 TCP 80 - HTTP Web Set default TCP action 
IDS Appliance reset 
10.3.1.17 TCP 80 - HTTP Web Set default TCP action 
reset 
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Novell Netware 3.12 -5.00 10 .3.1.1 8 TCP 80 - HTTP Web Set default TCP action 
reset 
FreeBSD 2.2.1 -ST ABLE 10 .3.1.19 TCP 80 -HTTP Web Set default TCP action 
reset 
FreeBSD 2.2.1 -STABLE 10 .3.1.19 TCP 80 - HTTP Web Set default TCP action 
reset 
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 10 .3.1.20 TCP23 - TELNET Telnet Set default UDP action 11.2 reset 
10 .3.1.200 No ports open MAC 00 :40 :96 :31 :8 1 :cf 
TABLE 4. 2 Honeyd technical configuration 
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4.1.4 Ring 1 honeypot asset 
SUENYEK 
The honeypot itself is a Linux Mandrake 9.0 machine that runs all the deceptive 
services that are required for the rings of deception in depth, in the wireless 
honeypot. The honeypot is the most protected ring, as the outer rings of deception 
cannot function without the operational core. Therefore, the honeypot deception 
encompasses the deceptions deployed through rings 2 and 3 .  
Proposed attacks on ring 1 
Attacking the honeypot itself requires targeted buffer overflows on OS flaws, or 
vulnerabilities revealed from the penetration testing on ring 2 of the deception. 
Buffer overflows or "smashing the stack" (McClure, Scambray, & Kurtz, 200 1 ,  
p. 1 61 )  refers to an attack that attempts to overwhelm the virtual memory with more 
input than the buffer stack may contain. 
Buffer overflow attacks are an increasing danger (Aleph One, n.d. ;  Cowan, Wagle, & 
Pu, 1 999; Grover, 2003; McClure et al., 2001 ), and "represent one of the most 
serious classes [of] security threats" (Cowan et al. ,  1 999, p. 1 )  in relation to network 
penetration. A successfully executed buffer overflow can cause system crashes and 
core dumps that may consequently allow the intruder to inject attack or malicious 
instructions into the system and network (ibid, 1 999). 
4.1 .5 Central logging structure 
The central logging structure encompasses an IDS namely SNORT (Caswell & 
Roesch, 2002) packet sniffer, that will serve in cooperation with the Honeyd logs to 
passively record all system traffic. The network data collected will confirm network 
penetration and buffer overflow success through captured and dissected data that 
include the source and destination: IP address, MAC address, TCP/IP ports, and the 
protocols used, as well as any buffer outputs. 
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4.2 Experimental Variables 
Each ring in the deception in depth draws on deceptive countermeasures, and each 
ring is targeted by anticipated deceptive network attacks. This describes the testable 
conditions for investigating deceptions used on the wireless honeypot. The 
arrangement of the experimental conditions thus guides the execution of the 
experiment (Sarantakos, 1 9 9 8 ). 
The following is a description of the experimental variables. The variables will be 
implemented to provide quantitative measurement of a causal or correlated 
relationship between the IV and DV's. 
The independent variable 
The independent variable (IV) is the deployed deceptive wireless honeypot and has 
conditions that are manipulated by the researcher as the causal object within the 
correlated relationship (Davis, 1 9 9 7b ). Quantitative measurements will be used for 
initial testing of the IV. The researcher will then manipulate the IV and perform a 
second round of quantitative measurements. This will also be used to identify any 
changes that may occur. 
The dependent variable 
The dependent variable (DV) is the effect, or the result of the manipulated IV (ibid, 
1 9 9 7b) which will be the different types of deceptions deployed. This will determine 
and quantify the strength of the correlated relationship, if any. The DV's will be 
defined in the research design as a matrix ( see sections 5 .2 . 1  and 5 .3 . 1  ). 
Alternate variables 
Alternate variables which may effect the outcomes of the experiment should be 
controlled or eliminated in order to support argument that the true cause of the 
measured outcomes are by result of the IV and not by any deviating variables that are 
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not considered as part of the experiment (ibid, 1 9 9 7a). Alternate variables will be 
considered in the research resign in descriptive tables of how the DV' s are deployed 
on the IV (see sections 5 .2 .1 and 5.3. 1 ). 
Control variables involve settings, configurations, and limitations of the tools and 
software used within the experiment that may alter the outcomes of the DV and 
involve deceptions that are not part of the intended condition of the IV. Control 
variables should be held constant by the researcher so they do not influence the 
results (ibid, 1 9 9 7 b ). However, due to the often-volatile nature of software, some 
control variables such as a one-off glitch, will be unavoidable. Therefore, they will 
be considered as a limitation of the research and will be addressed in the results (see 
chapters 6 and 7 )  and discussion (see chapter 8 ). 
Random variables 
Random variables are other variables that may be potential causes (ibid, 1 9 9 7b) and 
not the IV. This may include weather, interfering noise, inaccurate machine 
responses, or bugs in software. Eliminating such random variables involves 
anticipation and timely preparation. Repeated testing to compare the consistency of 
results of the experimental testing will aid reliability of results. 
Confounding variables 
Confounding variables are variables that may alter the IV and may result as the 
cause instead of the intended IV (ibid, 1 9 9 7 b ). Therefore, confounding variables of 
the deceptive wireless honeypot are unintended fluctuations of conditions on the IV, 
which may be a result in software errors or inaccurate configurations by the 
experimenter. Repeated tests should identify such errors for elimination. This should 
be identified during the experimentation, and addressed in the results section (see 
chapters 6 and 7). 
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5 CHAPTER 5 - DECEPTIVE COUNTERMEASURES AND 
ATTACK IMPLEMENTATION 
The chief goal of the experiment is to implement a composition of deceptions that 
simulate a real 802 . 1 1 b wireless integrated network to test the deceptive 
countermeasures against common network attacks. Utilising the identified technical 
and logical configurations of FakeAP and Honeyd, a coherent network using 
deceptive mechanisms may be deployed as a series of rings in deception in depth. 
A constructed matrix of deceptive countermeasures and attacks expresses a 
diagrammatic implementation of the experimental conditions for testing the nature of 
the relationship between deceptive defences of the wireless honeypot, and the 
potential outcomes of deceptive attacks. 
Thus, the framework for deception illustrates the theoretical dissection of deceptive 
categories and characteristics gathered from biological and military case study. The 
matrices also demonstrate implementation of those conceptual deceptions through 
testable conditions. The wireless honeypot will be the independent variable (IV) to 
be manipulated in the experiment, and the deceptive conditions identified in the 
matrices are the dependent variables (DV's). 
5.1 Applying the Framework for Deception to a Matrix 
The network countermeasures and attacks are categorised through the same levels of 
deception identified in the framework. Deceptive defences and deceptive offences 
are described independently as two matrices for each countermeasure and attack. The 
remaining deceptive categorisations are maintained in each matrix. This includes an 
active or passive state, followed by a static, dynamic, adaptive, or premeditative 
approach to implementing a masked, misleading, or confusing deceptive effect. 
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5.2 Deceptive Network Countermeasures 
Table 5.1 is the matrix of deceptive Defence Network Countermeasures (DNC) to be 
deployed on the wireless honeypot. The DNC encompasses deceptions employed on 
the Honeyd virtual networks and the CLS (Honeyd logs and IDS). Each defence 
strategy is reactive, and thus only executed after the attacking machine has initiated a 
probe or scan on the targeted wireless honeypot. 
Table 5.2 is the matrix of deceptive Offence Network Countermeasures (ONC). 
FakeAP beacons are the only ONC that will be deployed on the wireless honeypot. It 
is an offensive deception as it is activated regardless of an attacker executing any 
probes or scans. 
5.2.1 Application of the matrices of deceptive countermeasures 
The deceptive DNC and ONC in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are security strategies that aim to 
strengthen the wireless honeypot by employing the deceptive characteristics that 
were mapped from the framework for deception. 
Table 5.3 presents a detailed description of the conditions for deploying each 
deceptive countermeasure against the wireless honeypot. This will also entail 
explanations of the dependent variables (DV) of the experiment; with consideration 
of any random variables. The experimental conditions involve: 
• Identifying the ring of the deception in depth the countermeasure applies to 
• The deceptive effect sought as denoted on the matrix 
• An explained function of how the deception is performed 
• Random variables that may interfere or alter the intended experimental 
conditions 
• The method to overcome the random variables 
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TABLE 5. 1 Matrix of deceptive DNC 
TABLE 5. 2 Matrix of deceptive ONC 
t = mask, camouflage, repackage; + = mimic, mislead, decoy; ? = confuse, dazzle, invent; 
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Mimic OS appears as a real OS TCP/IP fingerprint OS personality must match a 
platform on an OS does not match an OS prescribed NMAP or Xprobe 
fin e rint latform si ature 
Mimic Appears as a true OS The flaw cannot be Test each OS with Nessus for 
flaw that may be exploitable through a vulnerabilities, if no vulnerabilities 
exploited buffer overflow occur, then change the OS as it is 
not dece tive 
Mislead The intruder believes an The vulnerability does Test the vulnerabilities by 
exploitable vulnerability not match the OS directing a targeted buffer 
exists overflow to that OS flaw 
Mislead Appears as a network of Incompatible platforms Conduct Nessus tests to check 
systems and not as a on the same network accurate configuration of networks 
standalone com uter in honeyd 
Mimic Routes packets through Packet latency does not Test packet latency through 
the networks match the network NMAP scans 
topolo y 
Mislead Intruder believes the NMAP TCP/IP stack Test NMAP scans and change the 
TCP/IP stack is matches cannot perform OS fingerprint until NMAP picks 
the TCP/IP stack of the handshakes with the up the correct OS match. 
OS TCP/IP stack of the 
scanned machine 
Mimic The stack acts the same Possible errors in Conduct several NMAP tests to 
as a real TCP/IP stack software ensure reliability 
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2 Mislead 
2 Mislead 
2 Mimic 
2 Mimic 
2 Mimic 
2 Mislead 
1 Camouflage 
SUENYEK 
TCP/IP fingerprint gives 
the guessed OS of the 
machine 
Intruder believes the 
machine has been crashed 
and the system is down 
Machine responds with a 
buffer overflow upon 
attack 
Services appear available 
for each OS 
Scripts appear as a 
typical banner upon 
scanning of the OS. 
Intruder believes the 
banner distinguishes the 
OS type and version. 
Passively gathers the 
honeyd logs without 
knowled e of the 
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TCP/IP fingerprint gives 
an incorrect guess of the 
OS 
OS may still be probed 
after an alleged buffer 
overflow hit 
The buffer overflow does 
not crash or core dump 
the system as it should 
Mismatched services for 
OS platforms 
The banner does not 
match the OS or the 
service. 
The OS banner message 
is inappropriate or does 
not match the OS. 
Intruder is able to 
compromise the honeyd 
and ain access to the 
Test NMAP scans and change the 
OS fingerprint until NMAP picks 
u the correct OS match 
Test buffer overflow attacks 
against Honeyd and change the OS 
if it may still be probed after an 
attack 
Change the OS fingerprint where 
the buffer overflow response is 
accurate. 
Nessus and NMAP tests will 
identify services available, if they 
are not intended; they may be 
eliminated or changed to match 
the OS 
Test Nessus and NMAP scans to 
view all banner scripts that appear 
and if they are accurately matched 
to the OS and service. 
Conduct Nessus tests to ensure all 
banners are appropriate and 
correct and eliminate those that are 
inapt. 
Encrypt log files an save on a 
separate machine 
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intruder. lo s. 
1 Camouflage Passively logs all Intruder is able to Save IDS logs on a separate 
wireless network activity compromise the IDS and machine. 
without knowledge of the gain access to the logs. 
intruder. 
3 Mislead Beaconing a faked SSID, Other legitimate APs that Test other APs in the coverage 
MAC and IP. beacon the same SSID, area for their SSID, MAC and IPs, 
MAC or IP. and ensure the FakeAP is 
different. 
3 Mimic Appears as an existing Beacons incorrect MAC Ensure the MAC address matches 
AP. address. the intended Cisco vendor' s first 6 
hex digits. 
3 Decoy Captures attention from AP beacons are not Test AP beacons and strength at 
existing APs. picked up by wireless various lengths. 
sniffers. 
3 Dazzle Set the AP to flick The IP of the flicking This will limit the deception 
through different MAC APs does not change. depending on the sniffing tool 
addresses and appear as used, as some will only give the 
many APs. MAC and others also give the IP. 
TABLE S. 3 Experimental conditions for deceptive DNC and ONC 
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In Table 5.3 varying experimental conditions are described that will be deployed on 
the wireless honeypot. This will allow investigation of what conditions and how 
conditions vary by the type of attacks that will be launched against the deceptive 
network countermeasures. 
5.3 Deceptive Network Attacks 
Table 5 .4 is the matrix of deceptive Network Defence Attacks (NDA) that will be 
carried out against the wireless honeypot. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) 
poisoning, IP spoofing and MAC spoofing are methods of attack that deceptively 
conceal the real identity of the attacker with a faked identity. These defence attacks 
are used as a preliminary technique for ingress to the network (which in this case is 
the Honeyd virtual networks) to then execute offensive deceptive attacks. 
Table 5.5 is the matrix of deceptive Network Offensive Attacks (NOA) that will be 
launched against the wireless honeypot. Offensive attacks may be brute forced such 
as continuous hits resulting in buffer overflows and other variants of Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks. Other attacks such as NMAP and Nessus scans seek to 
interact with the victim to collect useful OS configuration and vulnerability 
information. Brute force attacks are frequently active because they are aimed to take 
out the victim. 
A stealth attack such as a man-in-the-middle that initiates a single masked hit 
triggering a DoS, or breaking a wireless connection, is also active. A passive attack 
such as packet sniffing aims to inconspicuously intercept and capture data that is 
retained by the attacker. Packets will show data that include the network 
configurations that the attacker will use to tailor an active attack. 
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TABLE 5. 4 Matrix of deceptive DNA 
TABLE 5. 5 Matrix of deceptive ONA 
t = mask, camouflage, repackage; + = mimic, mislead, decoy; ? = confuse, dazzle, invent; 
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5.3.1 Application of the matrices of deceptive attacks 
SUENYEK 
The matrices of deceptive DNA and ONA identified in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are attack 
strategies that may be launched against the deceptive countermeasures on the 
wireless honeypot. Consequently, experimental conditions for deploying brute force 
attacks may be coordinated to test the effectiveness of deceptions used to defend the 
wireless honeypot. 
Table 5.6 presents the experimental conditions for potential attacks derived from the 
matrices of deceptive attacks (Tables 5.4 and 5.5) that may be performed against the 
wireless honeypot. The experimental conditions that may be tested are demonstrated 
through: 
• The deception in depth ring given for each attack, identifying the ring of the 
defence the attack is targeted to 
• The distinguished brute force network attacks from stealth attacks 
• Description of the function of the attacking deception in order to achieve the 
deceptive effect sought 
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./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
SUEN YEK 
Deceive ARP to believe the 
attacker has a legitimate MAC. 
Camouflage Appearing as a legitimate IP 
address 
Camouflage Appearing as a legitimate MAC 
address that may connect to the 
AP. 
Dazzle Overwhelm the memory stack of 
the target. 
Camouflage Intercept the connection without 
being detected . 
Dazzle Send overwhelming numbers of 
I CMP packets. 
./ Dazzle Hit the OS with an unexpected 
soli strike. 
./ Mask Inconspicuously sniff AP 
broadcast beacons. 
TABLE 5. 6 Experimental conditions for DNA and ONA 
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Gain access to honeypot' s ARP table and 
assume one of the MAC addresses or 
insert a false MAC . 
Use downloadable tools to spoof the IP 
of the attacker. 
Ascertain permissible MAC addresses 
from an ARP table, or obtain MAC 
address from packet headers travelling 
the rivate network. 
Exploiting a discovered flaw in the OS 
and targeting an excessive number of 
ackets to dazzle and crash the OS . 
Knock out the AP connection in a single 
concealed attack. 
Directing continuos ICMP packets or 
ICMP type floods to specific OS to cause 
a crash . 
Send a single hit to cause the OS to 
crash. 
Sniff packets to identify the AP MAC, IP 
and other confi urations to tailor attacks. 
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5.4 Research Design of the Framework and Matrices 
SUENYEK 
The research design of the framework and the matrices indicated that the active 
countermeasures should be implemented before the passive countermeasures. This is 
because the wireless honeypot must be proactively secured before enabling the 
correct deceptive response. Passive attacks will be initiated before active attacks to 
identify to the attacker, how to implement deceptive attacks against the victim. 
This presents a method for carrying out the experimental brute force and stealth 
attacks against the wireless honeypot. Additionally, the effectiveness of deceptions 
will be observed to discover if conditions vary by the type of attack and under what 
conditions. 
Thus, the wireless honeypot may be deployed following the deceptive network 
countermeasures identified in the DNC and ONC. Investigating the effectiveness of 
the deceptions on the wireless honeypot will be done through executing the deceptive 
network attacks identified in the DNA and ONA. This will enable the researcher to 
evaluate if the framework for deception may be applied to reduce the effectiveness of 
attacks, and the effectiveness of the wireless honeypot against brute force attacks. 
Additionally, the conditions identified in Tables 5.3 and 5.6 will be deployed to 
identify what conditions may vary by the type of attack. 
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6 CHAPTER 6 - ROUND 1 RESULTS 
6.1 Baseline Testing 
Round 1 testing involved a baseline test to determine if the wireless honeypot was 
able to be scanned or attacked with the given honeypot configurations and 
architecture. This was also to confirm if FakeAP and Honeyd were able to run 
concurrently. 
The attacking machine utilised Linux Mandrake 9.0 with dual boot Windows XP to 
allow the attacker to utilise various attacking tools for both OS platforms. The attack 
machine was also equipped with a wireless PCMCIA card. The following wireless 
security tools were installed: 
• Kismet 
• Netstumbler 
• NMAP 
• Nessus 
An attacker would typically use such tools, as they are free to download from the 
World Wide Web (WWW) and require little understanding of the technical 
functionality. The tools used for attacks against the wireless honeypot may be 
installed and used on a Linux or Windows machine. 
6.2 Ring 1 FakeAP 
Round 1 of testing involved FakeAP at the outer ring of the deception in depth for 
the wireless honeypot. Attacks identified in the matrix of deceptive attacks included 
the wireless sniffing tools for determining the existence of APs and their related 
configurations. 
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6.2.1 Kismet 
Kismet is a wireless sniffing tool that was installed on the attacking machine. Kismet 
was able to pick up the beaconed 802.11 b packets from a bogus access point, and 
identified the following information: 
• The SSID of the bogus AP as "WinNT AP" 
• The channel of the WinNT AP used which was channel 4 
• The IP address of the WinNT AP as 192.168.1.99 which consequently 
informs the attacker of the gateway IP address 
6.2.2 Netstumbler 
Netstumbler is a wireless sniffing tool for Windows platforms, and was also used to 
verify the information sniffed by Kismet. Netstumbler was able to enumerate the 
following information on the rogue AP: 
• The SSID as of the rogue AP as "WinNT AP" 
• The MAC address of WinNT AP and recognised the vendor as Cisco 
• The channel of the WinNT AP as channel 4 
6.3 Implications of FakeAP testing 
Testing in Round 1 FakeAP demonstrated that attacking tools Kismet and 
Netstumbler were able to sniff out the rogue AP. The attacking machine was able to 
identify information about the AP including an IP address of the AP gateway, and the 
SSID of the wireless network. The attacker could then reconfigure and spoof the IP 
of the attacking machine so that the attacking machine's IP may be on the same 
network as the rogue AP's. Subsequently the attacking machine's IP was changed to 
192.168.1.253 so that the attacking machine could then conduct further probing of 
network resources through the AP gateway of 192.168.1.99. 
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6.4 Ring 2 Honeyd 
Testing ring 2 of the deception in depth followed from ring 1 ,  FakeAP testing. 
Therefore, the next level of attack encompassed stealth and brute force scans and 
probes of the private network, which were the Honeyd virtual networks. The goal of 
the Round 1 testing on ring 2, was also a baseline test to investigate if attacking tools 
NMAP and Nessus would be deceived by the deceptions deployed on the wireless 
honeypot, through Honeyd. 
Two network scanning tools typically used by a script kiddie are NMAP and Nessus 
(Conry-Murray, 200 1 ;  Fratto, 2003 ; Noordergraaf, 2002) and were subsequently the 
attacking tools selected for network attacks on ring 2 of the wireless honeypot. The 
testing incorporated assessment of the outputs and reports generated from the attack 
tools. 
A naYve attacker such as a script kiddie would use NMAP stealth scans by selecting a 
block of IP addresses to scan the network. NMAP then return results informing the 
attacker of the OS and platform that it believes is running on the IP address, and any 
interesting ports that should be noted; such as TCP port 23 (telnet) - open. An 
attacker could then be well informed on what OS's are on selected IP's and enter 
those IP's  into Nessus for brute force scanning and probing. 
Nessus will forcefully scan each IP address selected by the attacker and probe every 
specified port. Nessus then generates a report that details the OS and security 
information including security warnings such as banners, and vulnerabilities or holes 
that identify a dangerous threat exposure of a specific service or a TCP /IP port. 
The deceptive capability of ring 2 testing was determined by how well NMAP and 
Nessus could be fooled into believing an OS existed, and if any security 
vulnerabilities existed on the OS. 
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6.4.1 Round 1 NMAP testing 
NMAP (Fyodor, 2003b) scans networks for live hosts and offered services through 
the known sequence of TCP/IP handshakes of various OS's. Therefore, NMAP uses 
a method of OS fingerprinting to identify the networks of wired and wireless services 
that were associated with Honeyd. Table 6. 1 describes the functions of the different 
NMAP scans (Fyodor, 200 1)  that were used to perform the NMAP OS fingerprinting 
on the Honeyd. 
SYN scans 
TCP connect 
NMAP sends a SYN packet to half open a 
TCP connection, if the response is a 
SYN/ ACK a RST will be sent to abandon the 
connection. This type of SYN technique is 
rarel lo ed. 
TCP connections are attempted on all ports of 
a tar et machine. 
Determines which UDP ports are open when 
there is no ICMP ort unreachable messa e. 
Advanced stealth scans 
Closed ports reply with a RST 
Open ports ignore the packet 
Will not work on a Windows machine -
hence identifying that the target machine is 
most likely a Windows OS. 
Uses TCP/IP handshakes to make an OS 
'fingerprint' and checks it against the NMAP 
OS fin e rint file. 
Splits the TCP header over more smaller 
ackets as an attem ts to evade detection. 
TABLE 6. 1 NMAP v .3 scan types 
A SYN scan was conducted on each IP address to determine if the Honeyd would 
deceptively respond by detecting the half-open connections and discarding them. 
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SYN scans, in combination with OS detection (-0), and fragmented packets (-F) 
would typically be used by the attacker to determine the OS of the machine, ports 
that are listening, and services running while evading detection by the target 
machine. The outcome of the scan may reveals if the attacker is fooled by the NMAP 
result returning a successful OS match. 
UDP scans 
UDP scans with OS detection and fragment determine which UDP ports are open, 
and are potential ports for placing a Trojan, or backdoor such as bo2k to listen on. 
An attacker would believe an open UDP port could be vulnerable and exploit the 
possibility of injecting malicious software. Therefore, NMAP, UDP scans attempts to 
identify which OS's would potentially be vulnerable to these types of attacks. 
FIN, XMAS, and NULL scans 
FIN, XMAS, and NULL scans attempt a further clandestine approach to port 
scanning and OS detection. Due to the technical configurations of Windows 
machines, these scans usually do not work. However, a failed scan may deceptively 
be construed by the attacker as a possible Windows 95 or 98 machine. 
The aim of the NMAP scans was to determine if Honeyd could deceptively mislead 
NMAP into believing there were ports and services belonging to an OS of a machine. 
Subsequently an attacker using NMAP may also be deceived. This information 
would then be used to tailor an attack to the specified OS. 
Table 6.2 shows the results of Round 1 of the NMAP scans that were conducted as a 
baseline test to ensure the machine could be probed wirelessly. The researcher chose 
IP addresses with no significance to the logical network topology and assigned them 
one of nine NMAP prescribed OS signatures, only to establish if the Honeyd virtual 
networks could be reached via a wireless NMAP scan. 1 0.3 . 1 . 1 5, 1 0.3 . 1 . 1 9  and 
10.3 . 1 .20 were unallocated IP address spaces which the researcher also performed 
8 1  
APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION SUEN YEK 
NMAP scans on to observe if the default OS assigned by ARPD, would also be 
detected. 
The default OS was FreeBSD and was randomly selected to test if ARPD was able to 
pick up which IP addresses did not have a prescribed OS bound to the IP, and would 
automatically allocate the default. This formed part of the baseline testing of Round 
1. 
Three scans were conducted for each NMAP scan type, and on each IP address to 
check the reliability of results on each scan. It was found there were some software 
bugs in NMAP and Honeyd which created some inconsistencies, thus a fourth scan 
was conducted for the SYN and XMAS scans. Honeyd crashed on the second test for 
XMAS scans for an unknown reason, most likely due to a one-off software 
malfunction. Therefore, Honeyd was restarted and an extra XMAS scan was 
performed. 
SYN scans 
SYN scans were the most effective at guessing the correct remote OS. The Cisco 
router and hub OS's, Novell, AIX, and OpenBSD could all be successfully detected 
on all four SYN scans conducted. NMAP however, could not detect Solaris on any 
SYN scans, indicating a possible error in the Honeyd configuration file, or an 
unmatching NMAP fingerprint in the NMAP fingerprint file. Further results showed 
the NMAP OS guess for Cisco Aironet AP defaulted to FreeBSD on two SYN scans, 
and then crashed for the succeeding two SYN scans. 
SYN scans performed on the Default OS, FreeBSD (IP addresses 10.3.1.19 and 
10.3.1.20) resulted in two successful OS guesses; however, a third scan crashed 
which indicated NMAP was not able to guess the OS at all. A fourth SYN scan was 
conducted to check if the results of the third test was a chance outcome, though the 
result showed a crash again. 
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UDP scans 
Successful NMAP, UDP scans, that were able to guess the correct OS, were only on 
the Cisco router, AIX, Novell and OpenBSD. All other OS's could not be guessed. 
This indicated that the NMAP fingerprint file possibly did not have an OS fingerprint 
record for UDP ports on those unsuccessful OS's. 
FIN, XMAS, and NULL scans 
FIN scans were able to guess the OS reliably in most cases, except one instance with 
Novell Netware (IP 10.3 . 1 .18), but was not able to identify any of the IP addresses 
that were assigned the default FreeBSD, and Solaris (10.3.1.17). FIN and NULL 
scans also produced the default FreeBSD OS guess for the Cisco Aironet 
( 10.3.1.200). However, all other scans on 10.3.1.200 resulted in a crash and no OS 
guess at all. Therefore, NMAP was overall ineffective at guessing the Cisco Aironet 
OS. 
NULL scans could successfully identify the Cisco router, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, AIX, 
and Novell. The XMAS scans resulted in a correct remote OS guess for the Cisco 
router, AIX, OpenBSD and Novell. All other NULL and XMAS scans could not find 
an OS match for the fingerprint. This indicated that opened and closed ports on those 
OS's did not respond in an expected RST, or an ignore response, so that NMAP 
could identify the OS. Consequently, those OS's could not be identified by an 
NMAP, UDP scan. 
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Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 4 0 
1 1 .2 
FreeBSD 2.2. 1 -ST ABLE 2 2 
4 0 
Default FreeBSD 2.2 . 1 -STABLE 0 4 
OpenBSD 2. 7 /SP ARC or NFR 4 0 
IDS A pliance ( 12/10 /00 ) 
0 4 
Novell Netware 3 . 12 - 5.00 4 0 
Default FreeBSD 2.2 . 1 -STABLE 2 2 
Default FreeBSD 2.2. 1 -ST ABLE 2 2 
Aironet AP4800 E v8 .0 7  - 0 4 
Aironet (Cisco?) 1 1  Mbps 
wireless access oint 
TABLE 6. 2 Results of Round 1 NMAP scans 
./ = number of correct OS guesses; x = number of incorrect OS guesses or no OS match; D = a Boolean value (True or False) indicating if the 
deception was achieved through a correct OS guess on each scan; 
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The Round 1 NMAP scans indicated that NMAP is was always reliable on a single 
scan attempt; several scan attempts were required to check the reliability of scan 
results. Additionally, not all scan types could successfully identify a correct OS 
match. This indicated that not all the NMAP OS fingerprints have the ability to 
detect the OS when attempting unconventional TCP connections. 
6.4.2 Round 1 Nessus testing 
Round 1 testing using Nessus aimed to determine if Nessus would be deceived by 
returning the OS platform with a list of the services available, as specified by the 
Honeyd configuration file. Nessus also utilises NMAP scanning however unlike 
NMAP, Nessus will not assume that a given service will operate on an expected 
TCP/IP port. Nessus will test the security of every port regardless of the version 
number of the service (Deraison, 2003b ). This allows Nessus to generate information 
on the security warnings, holes and vulnerabilities which in tum provides significant 
OS exploit opportunities to a would be attacker. 
For the purpose of the Round 1 Nessus baseline testing, it was only necessary for 
Nessus to report the matching remote OS guess and exploitable security information 
on ports/services set in the Honeyd configuration file for each OS. 
Three Nessus scans were conducted on each IP to ensure validity. All three tests 
conducted on each of the IP's returned the same results indicating the Nessus scans 
gave consistent results. Each Nessus scan generated a report that listed the TCP/IP 
ports opened and any related security warnings, vulnerabilities (security holes), and 
the level of the security threat posed (indicated as a low, medium or high). Table 6.3 
is a table of the results from the Round 1 Nessus scans. 
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3com Office Connect Router 810 
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 11.2 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE 
� Solaris 2.6 - 7 (SP ARC) 
enBSD 2.6-2.8 
"' Solaris 2.6 - 7 (SP ARC) 
Novell Netware 5.x 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-ST ABLE 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-ST ABLE 
SUEN YEK 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 
TABLE 6. 3 Results from Round 1 Nessus scans 
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Nessus was able to successfully guess all but two OS's and report security holes, 
warnings, and vulnerabilities that applied to services run on each OS. Nessus scans 
performed on the Cisco router and hub/switch (10.3.1.1 and 10.3.1.12) returned 
telnet service warnings and one security vulnerability/hole. Nessus was also able to 
pick up the default OS (FreeBSD), AIX, Solaris (10.3.1.17), OpenBSD and Novell 
with at least one warning on each OS. 
Nessus indicated IP 10.3.1.15 as a Solaris OS when in fact the default OS (FreeBSD) 
would have been the correct OS guess. Additionally IP 10.3.1.200 came up as the 
default OS and not the Cisco Aironet AP. These errors indicated that the Honeyd 
configuration file most likely had an error with the Solaris and Cisco Aironet 
personality signatures that would need correcting for Round 2 testing. 
6.5 Implications of Round 1 Testing 
The overall results from Round 1 testing reported on attacks and intrusions that were 
conducted on ring 1 of the defence, FakeAP and ring 2, Honeyd. Results from ring 1 
testing showed that the fake access point could be sniffed and identified by the 
wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler. The information collected by the 
sniffing tools identified the existence of an AP by the SSID, IP address, MAC 
address, channel used, and a potential gateway to a private wireless network (Honeyd 
virtual networks). 
Results from ring 2 testing utilised network scanning tools NMAP and Nessus to 
enumerate remote OS guesses of a private network (Honeyd virtual networks) and 
their matching IP's by using various stealth scans. Nessus was able to give further 
OS security warnings, vulnerabilities and holes on services running on the scanned 
OS through brute forced probes. 
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Consequently, Round 2 of the testing will involve further NMAP and Nessus probes 
on a reconfigured Honeyd network to investigate if the scanning tools may detect all 
the OS's. 
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7 CHAPTER 7 - ROUND 2 RESULTS 
7.1 Reconfiguring Honeyd 
SUEN YEK 
For Round 2 testing, Honeyd was reconfigured to reflect a more realistic layout of a 
corporate wireless network. Figure 7.1  illustrates the revised Honeyd virtual 
networks as a logical configuration. The Linux Mandrake 9.0 machine was 
maintained as the honeypot installed with FakeAP and Honeyd. The gateway IP 
address of FakeAP, which is also the access point gateway to the Honeyd virtual 
networks, remained as 1 92. 1 68 . 1 .99. The network topology of routers, servers, and 
client machines are presented as a structured logical layout in Figure 7 . 1 .  This model 
was validated as a practicable network configuration by (Dawson, 2003 ; Valli, 
2003a, personal communication). 
The logical network topology of the Honeyd virtual networks encompasses three 
subnets separated by Routerone, a hub and Routertwo. The first network (network 
address 10 . 1 .0.0) utilises Routerone with IP address 1 0. 1 . 1 . 1  as the first route entry 
into the network. Only the Cisco Aironet AP shares the same network address as 
Routerone. 
The second subnet has the network address of 10.2. 1 .0 and is intended to be seen as a 
corporate Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) containing all the network servers. Six OS 
platforms are allocated to six IP address spaces in this network. A second linked 
route entry using a hub (IP 1 0.2. 1 . 1 )  separates the OS platforms Linux, AIX, 
OpenBSD, Solaris, FreeBSD and Novell. These OS's were chosen to represent a 
variety of platforms with testable vulnerabilities. Changes to the application level 
involved the appropriate Web service for each OS platform, which is identified as 
AP ACHE for the majority of OS's. 
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The third subnet uses the network IP address of 1 0.3 . 1 .0 and a connecting route entry 
via Routertwo (IP 10.3 . 1 . 1 ). This subnet encompasses a network of all the 
unallocated IP spaces that will be assigned the default OS through ARPD. Therefore, 
all IP address spaces in network three are Windows 98 machines. The purpose of this 
network is to appear as an assembly of Windows 98 client machines that access the 
servers and services from the DMZ. Table 7. 1 identifies the precise NMAP OS 
signature, and accompanying technical configurations for the revised Honeyd virtual 
networks. 
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3com Office Connect Router 810 TCP 23 - TELNET 
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 11.2 TCP 23 - TELNET 
Cisco 726 Non-IOS Software release TCP 23 - TELNET 
4.1(2) or 766 ISDN router 
Aironet AP4800E v8.07 - Aironet 10.1.1.0 10.1.1.2 
(Cisco?) 11 Mbps wireless access 
oint 
Solaris 2.6 - 7 X86 10.2.1.0 10.2.1.5 HTTP 80 - WEB 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE 10.2.1.0 10.2.1.6 HTTP 80 - WEB 
Novell Netware 3.12 - 5.00 10.2.1.0 10.2.1.7 HTTP 80 - WEB 
. Linux Kernel 2.4.0 - 2.4.18 (X86) 10.2.1.0 10.2.1.2 HTTP 80 - WEB 
AIX v4.2 10.2.1.0 10.2.1.3 HTTP 80 - WEB 
TCP 21 - FTP 
OpenBSD 2. 7 /SP ARC or NFR IDS 10.2.1.0 10.2.1.4 HTTP 80 - WEB 
A pliance ( 12/10/00 ) 
Windows98 w/ Service Pack 1 10.3.1.0 Unassigned 
TABLE 7. 1 Revised Honeyd virtual networks - technical configuration 
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7.2 Round 2 Testing 
7.2.1 Round 2 NMAP testing 
SUENYEK 
The purpose of Round 2 NMAP testing was to investigate if the reconfigured 
Honeyd could deceive NMAP. This would be achieved through NMAP guessing the 
correct remote OS using the same scan techniques. Corrections were made to the 
Honeyd configuration file to remove errors and ensure that all the scripts were 
accurately matched to an NMAP prescribed signature. The same five NMAP scans, 
SYN, FIN, XMAS, NULL and UDP were conducted as in Round 1 ,  however for 
Round 2, five scans were performed to validate the final NMAP scan/test results. 
Table 7 .3 shows the findings from the Round 2 NMAP scans. 
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3com Office Connect Router 8 10 
Aironet AP4 800 E v8 .0 7  - Aironet 
(Cisco?) 11 Mbps wireless access 
point 
Windows9 8 w/ Service Pack 1 4 1 
Network Address 4 1 
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 11 .2 5 0 
Linux Kernel 2.4.0 -2.4.1 8 (X86) 5 0 
AIX v4 .2 5 0 
OpenBSD 2. 7 /SPARC or NFR IDS 5 0 
A liance 12/10 /00 ) 
Solaris 2 .6 -7 X86 0 5 
FreeBSD 2.2.1-STABLE 0 5 
Novell Netware 3.12 -5 .00 5 0 
Windows9 8 w/ Service Pack 1 3 2 
Network Address 3 2 
Cisco 726 Non-IOS Software 5 0 
release 4.1 2) or 766 ISDN router 
Windows9 8 w/ Service Pack 1 
TABLE 7. 2 Results from Round 2 NMAP scans 
,/ = number of correct OS guesses; .)( = number of of incorrect OS guesses or no OS match; D = a Boolean value (True or False) indicating if the 
deception was achieved through a correct OS guess on each scan 
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SYN scans 
The SYN scan was conducted first with results that differed from the Round 1 
NMAP, SYN scans. The Cisco routers, AP, hub, Linux, AIX, OpenBSD and Novell 
could all be successfully fingerprinted. However, the Solaris and FreeBSD OS 
platforms could not be guessed by any NMAP, SYN scan. Additionally, the default 
Windows 98 IP's were successfully fingerprinted until half way through the 4th round 
of SYN scans, when NMAP continuously crashed on all IP's scanned with the 
default OS of Windows 98 . 
An interesting software anomaly found in the NMAP scans was that the network 
addresses were also scanned ( on all scan types), although the network address was 
not specified to be scanned by the researcher. As the network addresses were not 
allocated any instructions in the Honeyd configuration file (such as a request timed 
out message), the default OS should have been assigned by ARPD. 
For half the SYN scans conducted, each network address scanned returned the 
default OS of Windows 98. However, as the OS guesses on the default designated 
IP's began to crash half way through the NMAP SYN scans, returning an 
unsuccessful NMAP fingerprint and subsequently no OS guess, so did the network 
addresses. 
FIN scans 
Round 2 of FIN scans indicated the NMAP was able to successfully fingerprint and 
guess the correct remote OS for both Routers, the Cisco Aironet AP, hub, Linux, 
AIX, OpenBSD and Novell. Failed NMAP fingerprints using a FIN scan could not 
identify Solaris, FreeBSD and any of the default OS allocated IP addresses. 
XMAS, NULL, and UDP stealth scans 
Round 2 of the XMAS, NULL and UDP scans returned almost identical results, 
except the first NULL scan conducted on Linux; which NMAP could not fingerprint. 
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XMAS, NULL, and UDP scans were able to guess the correct OS for the AP, Linux, 
AIX, OpenBSD, and Novell. The Cisco Routers, hub, Solaris, FreeBSD, and all 
default IP addresses could not be fingerprinted. 
Another NMAP abnormality that became apparent was in the XMAS scans where 
the network addresses were scanned in-between each selected scanned IP in the 
network. The number of scans conducted on each network address is given below: 
• 10.1.1.0 - scanned 3 times 
• 10.2.1.0 - scanned 8 times 
• 10.3.1.0 - scanned 2 times 
It was not known why the NMAP XMAS scans did this, although it may be 
attributable to a software error. 
7.2.2 Round 2 Nessus testing 
Round 2 of the Nessus scans was aimed to investigate if Nessus could be deceived by 
the revised Honeyd, and potentially appear realistic to an attacker scanning the 
network. Nessus was required to guess the remote OS platform and any security 
information that would be exploitable for a would-be attacker. 
For the Round 2 testing, five scans were attempted on each OS allocated IP address 
in Honeyd. However, it was found that Nessus was not able to scan the IP 10.1.1.1 
(Routerone) at all, and any default OS assigned IP addresses, such as in network 
10.3.1.0 (excluding 10.3.1.1, which is Routertwo) would take an extensively long 
time and resulted in a Nessus Crash. The 3com Office Connect Router 810 on IP 
10.1.1. 1 would stop and close at every attempt made by the researcher to scan the IP. 
Consequently, the results shown in Table 7.4 exclude the OS platforms, and IP 
addresses that Nessus could not scan. 
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No OS guess 
Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 11.2 
,, Linux Kernel 2.4.0 - 2.5.20 
AIX v4.2 
ess 
� Novell NetWare 3.12 - 5.00 
Cisco 762 Non-IOS Software 
release 4.1(2) or 766 ISDN router 
http 80/tcp 
telnet 23/tcp 
SUENYEK 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
TABLE 7. 3 Results from Round 2 Nessus scans 
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In the Round 2 N essus tests, each N essus scan generated a report that listed the ports 
opened and any related security information such as the warnings, vulnerabilities 
(security holes), and the level of the security threat posed. The results in Table 7.4 
represent the outcomes from all five scans conducted on each of the IP addresses 
listed. 
Each of the 5 scans performed on all the listed IP' s produced the same findings 
except for the 4th Nessus scan conducted on IP 10.2. 1 . 1  (Cisco Router/Switch with 
IOS 1 1 .2), which produced two security warnings. The other four scans performed 
on 1 0.2. 1 . 1  produced only one warning, as demonstrated in Table 7.4. In the Round 2 
Nessus testing, this was the only irregular finding. This indicated that the Nessus 
software was subject to some differences when used continually to scan IP addresses. 
However, Nessus was still able to guess the remote OS for the Cisco Routers, Linux, 
AIX, OpenBSD, Solaris, and Novell. Additionally, Nessus found at least one security 
vulnerability and/or vulnerability (hole) on each of the OS's for a potential attacker 
to investigate further and exploit. 
Nessus was not able to guess the OS for IP 10.2. l .6 which was FreeBSD. It is 
probable that Nessus was unsure of the exact OS on the IP 10.2. 1 .6; however, a 
warning was still found from the N essus probes performed on that OS. Below is the 
warning generated by the Nessus scan performed on 10.2. 1 .6: 
Warning found on port general/tcp 
The remote host uses non-random IP IDs, that is, it is 
possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of 
the ip packets sent by this host. 
An attacker may use this feature to determine if the remote 
host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be 
used for portscanning and other things. 
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Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch 
Risk factor : Low 
Nessus ID : 1 0201 
SUENYEK 
As the attacker usually cannot differentiate if this warning is a false-positive, it may 
not matter if the OS was undetectable. The deception is this instance is that the 
warning provides a misleading vulnerability of the potential OS. This may still be 
exploited by an attacker by searching the vulnerability on the Internet to discover 
how it may be exploited. Example sites are CERT, Bugtraq, CVE and SecuriTeam 
vulnerability search engines and databases. 
It was not known why IP 1 0. 1 .1 . 1 ,  Routerone with the OS of 3com Office Connect 
Router 8 1 0, could not be scanned at all. Nessus would attempt to initiate a 
connection but then drop the scan without producing any findings. Additionally, 
Nessus was ineffective at scanning a target machine with the default OS allocated to 
the IP. Nessus would complete the scan after an extensively long time. Each scan 
usually had duration of approximately 15minutes. The Windows 98 IP addresses 
lasted for up to 45 minutes, and Nessus would then crash without producing a 
generated report of results. 
7.2.3 Results from the Central Logging Structure (CLS) 
The intended purpose of the CLS was to provide a supplementary method of data 
collection to triangulate and verify attacks made on the wireless honeypot. The CLS 
comprised of the Honeyd log files, which demonstrated themselves to be lacking in 
the richness of information given. The Honeyd logs only indicated that TCP/IP ports 
had some activity, and did not give further information of the possible attacks being 
performed on the network level. Therefore, the researcher discovered that the 
Honeyd log files were not effective in aiding the deceptions. 
The SNORT log files verified the attacks achieved by Nessus. This was useful for the 
researcher as it provided triangulated verification of the Nessus generated reports of 
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scans. This also aided the deceptions through camouflaged that concealed the 
victim's knowledge of attacker activity. 
7.3 Implications of Round 2 Testing 
The overall results gathered from Round 2 testing focussed on NMAP and Nessus 
scans and probes. Honeyd was reconfigured to overcome suspected errors found in 
Round 1 ,  NMAP and Nessus tests. However, for Round 2 testing, Honeyd did not 
demonstrate that it could deceive effectively all the NMAP and Nessus attacks. 
Both NMAP and Nessus revealed software abnormalities through performing 
additional scans that were not requested by the researcher, and refusing to perform 
scans that were requested by the researcher. However, NMAP was able to detect 
three OS's across all the five scan types out of sixteen that were scanned, and they 
were AIX, OpenBSD, and the Cisco Aironet AP. This indicated that some of the 
Honeyd deceptions were successful in fooling NMAP. Nessus reported at least one 
security warning or vulnerability on all the OS' s  that it could perform a complete 
scan. Honeyd was therefore effective at deceiving Nessus for only nine out of the 
possible twelve scans. 
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8 CHAPTER 8 - DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
SUENYEK 
Results from Round 1 and Round 2 testing are combined in a discussion relating to 
the research questions: 
1. Can a framework for deception be applied to common network 
countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks? 
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot against brute force attacks? 
3. Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack? 
8.1 Can a Framework for Deception be applied to Common Network 
Countermeasures to Reduce the Effectiveness of Attacks? 
8.1 .1  Ring 1 - FakeAP 
The deceptions for FakeAP resulted as highly effective countermeasures against the 
network attacks of the wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler. The 
framework was used to determine how to implement the deceptions for FakeAP. The 
identified deceptions were mimicry, misleading, and decoying. 
The forensic data that was collected from Kismet and Netstumbler indicated they 
were both misled into believing a bogus AP existed. This was done by FakeAP's 
mimicry of a real AP. It is also likely that the decoyed deception would be achieved, 
if a potential attacker were able to sniff the bogus AP. This is because the attacker 
consumes time and resources when sniffing the fake AP; and consequently, the 
attacker may become deterred from a real AP. 
A script kiddie using Kismet or Netstumbler may be misled into thinking a real AP 
existed. Furthermore, the potential attacker could think there is a network behind the 
AP that may be scanned, probed, and exploited. Thus, the deceptions implemented 
on FakeAP, which were identified from the framework, were effective 
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countermeasures on the wireless honeypot against the attacking tools Kismet and 
Netstumbler. 
8.1.2 Ring 2 - Honeyd 
The deceptions employed by the Honeyd virtual networks were not effective, on 
every occasion, in deceiving the attack tools used. The framework identified mimicry 
and misleading deceptions for the Honeyd countermeasures. This was to be 
demonstrated through faked: OS's, login-banners, services, and OS vulnerabilities. 
The attacking tool NMAP was used first to determine if it would be able to guess the 
OS on each of the IP's scanned. Subsequently, this was used to determine if Honeyd 
was able to mimic all the OS's. 
Evaluating the framework in reducing the effectiveness of NMAP attacks 
NMAP was unable to detect all the OS's in both Round 1 and Round 2 testing. 
However, through the application of the framework, the researcher found a highly 
useful method for understanding how to deploy Honeyd deceptions. The researcher 
learned the value of OS mimicry as a significant network countermeasure against 
attacks. This was demonstrated by NMAP's ability to fingerprint three of the Honeyd 
OS's. 
In Round 2 of the NMAP scans, the Cisco Aironet AP, AIX, and OpenBSD OS's 
indicated a highly effectively deception achieved, through OS mimicry. This was 
demonstrated through successful OS guesses from NMAP, for each scan that was 
conducted across all the five scan-types. 
NMAP believed that the Cisco Aironet AP, AIX, and OpenBSD OS's were real. A 
script kiddie would typically rely on NMAP to distinguish what is real and what is 
not. Subsequently the attacker may begin probing those OS's for vulnerabilities 
using a tool like Nessus. However, as the OS's are not real, the attacker would be 
misled into wasting time and resources on the faked OS's. 
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Therefore, in applying the framework to the wireless honeypot, it was determined 
that OS mimicry was an effective deception used as a network countermeasure. This 
was demonstrated through the successful mimicry of three OS's using Honeyd, 
against the attacking tool NMAP. Additionally, effective OS mimicry would also 
achieve a misleading deception for the potential script kiddie. 
Evaluating the framework in reducing the effectiveness of Ness us attacks 
The framework was also used to identify deceptions including faked: OS 
vulnerabilities, security holes, login-banners, and services through mimicry and 
misleading deceptions. These Honeyd deceptions were tested against Nessus scans. 
The results showed that Nessus was not able to identify all the OS's, although, was 
able to find at least one OS security warning or vulnerability for each of the scanned 
OS's. 
The mimicry of the faked login-banners on the Cisco routers appeared real, in 
addition to the faked security warnings, and service vulnerabilities that Nessus found 
on each of the OS's. These deceptions would typically fool a script kiddie. This is 
because they would not normally be able to distinguish the difference between a 
false-positive OS weakness, and a genuine OS weakness. The result would be that 
the attacker would think any OS weakness found by Nessus would be an opportunity 
for exploit. 
The results from the Nessus reports were valuable in identifying the level of 
deception achieved by Honeyd. The results revealed which countermeasures would 
require a greater level of mimicry and misleading in order to fool the network attack 
tool Nessus. An example was the web service run on each of the servers, which 
Nessus identified as IIS v.5 in Round 1 .  However, most of the server platforms 
should have been using the AP ACHE web service. Therefore, this would was 
changed to facilitate an effective deception of misleading the attacker for Round 2. 
The framework was thus useful in identifying how each Honeyd countermeasure 
may be implemented to deceive Nessus attacks. Additionally, the researcher found 
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the framework to be highly useful for determining which deceptions may be 
deployed on the wireless honeypot, against the attack tools NMAP, Kismet and 
Netstumbler. 
It may also be assumed that the framework would be useful for determining how to 
implement deceptions to fool other network attacking tools. These include wireless 
sniffing tools such as Dsniff, WaveLAN, and AirMagnet. Network security tools that 
may also be used for attacking include SATAN, Whisker and WebTrends Security 
Analyzer. therefore according to the results gathered by the experiment, the 
researcher found that the framework for deception may be applied to common 
network countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of attacks. 
8.2 How effective is Deception in a Wireless Honeypot against Brute 
Force Attacks? 
The brute force attacks that were tested against the wireless honeypot were primarily 
Nessus scans and probes. Nessus uses NMAP stealth scans to guess the remote OS 
and then forcibly probes each service with any known vulnerabilities. Nessus was 
able to detect at least one security warning or vulnerability on each of the OS's 
scanned. However, Nessus was not able to guess the correct OS on all scans, and in 
addition was not able to scan all the OS's selected by the researcher. 
In Round one of the Nessus testing, Nessus did not guess the OS for the Cisco 
Aironet AP and guessed the default OS instead. It was discovered that the Honeyd 
configuration file had an error and this was changed for the Round two testing. 
However, after the reconfiguration of Honeyd for Round two testing, Nessus 
produced less successful results. Nessus was not able to scan all the OS's and again, 
was not able to guess the Cisco Aironet AP. 
The researcher could not identify why the Nessus scans were less effective in Round 
2 of the testing, than in Round 1 .  Therefore, the researcher evaluated the 
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effectiveness of NMAP scans as an aid to understanding the possible causes for the 
irregularities found in the Nessus results. 
It was also found that the NMAP scans were less successful at guessing the OS's in 
Round 2 of the testing, than in Round 1 .  Even after correcting the Honeyd 
configuration file, not all the NMAP scans were able to successfully fingerprint and 
guess the OS's. Moreover, the percentage of correct OS guesses achieved in the first 
Round of testing was higher at 43 .6%, in comparison to the percentage of correct OS 
guesses achieved in the second Round of testing; which was 33 .75%. 
Furthermore, Figure 8 . 1  depicts a comparison of NMAP scan results for each scan 
type performed in Round 1 and Round 2 tests. The diagram identifies that the SYN 
scans conducted showed approximately 50% successful scans over the two Rounds 
of testing. FIN and NULL scans were significantly improved in Round 1 ,  when 
compared to Round 2 results. UDP scans were reasonably more successful in Round 
1 ,  and XMAS scans produced some successful guesses in Round 2, compared to 
none in Round 1 .  
NMAP Com parison of Scan Resu lts 
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0% 
SYN FIN XMAS NULL UDP 
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FIGURE 8. 1 A comparison of NMAP scans performed 
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The implications of these NMAP results indicated that in the experiment, NMAP was 
could not reliably fingerprint the Honeyd OS's across the five scan types. No 
correlated relationship between the IV and DV' s of Honeyd deceptions may be 
drawn from these results. 
The NMAP OS fingerprints selected for Honeyd were previously tested against all 
five scan types in a wired environment. Each OS fingerprint was able to be 
successfully detected by the NMAP SYN, FIN, XMAS, UPD and NULL scans 
(Valli, 2003b). However, the results showed that NMAP was not able to fingerprint 
successfully the OS's in a wireless environment using the same five scan types. 
This may be attributable to a number of factors. The researcher's  opinion is that the 
network packet sequence and exchange over the wireless medium most likely caused 
the irregularity in NMAP scan results. The open air allows a greater possibility of 
disordered packet sequencing and loss of packets, than over wired media. 
Another possibility may be that NMAP (the software) begins to crash when it is used 
excessively for prolonged periods. Many of the NMAP scans were performed on up 
to 1 6  IP spaces at a time, and scan types were executed consecutively. Additionally, 
the ratio of correct OS guesses in the first Round of testing was higher than that of 
the second Round of testing; which was 34 more scans. 
Thus, the increased amount of scanning performed may have initiated a software 
overload and produced erroneous packets. Therefore, NMAP' s inability to guess 
correctly each of the OS's, may have been a carry-over effect on the Nessus scans. 
This is because Nessus also utilises NMAP OS fingerprinting to guess the remote OS 
in each scan, and then Nessus performs the brute force probing for vulnerabilities. 
Nessus however, was able to guess correctly each of the OS platforms for all the 
scans it completed, for both Round 1 and Round 2 testing. Nessus also generated at 
least one security warning or vulnerability. Figure 8.2 outlines the scans results of 
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both the Nessus scans conducted. The majority of Nessus scans produced the correct 
OS, with security warnings or vulnerabilities. There were no more than two incorrect 
guesses at a time and only in Round 2 of the Nessus scans, where there null/no 
attempts. This indicated that Honeyd was effective on most occasions, at deceiving 
Nessus; however, not in every case. 
Nessus Comparison of Scan Resu lts 
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Correct Incorrect No attempt 
OS Scan Success 
FIGURE 8. 2 A comparison of Nessus scans conducted 
Therefore, the NMAP stealth scans and Nessus brute force attacks identified a 
possible anomaly in the way wireless network scanning may be conducted. 
Consequently, the results ascertained from the NMAP and Nessus tests indicated that 
the deceptions used in the wireless honeypot were not effective on all occasions, 
against the brute force attacks. This was demonstrated by the various discrepancies 
found in the scan results, and the unpredictability of the wireless experimental 
environment discussed above. 
8.3 Under what Conditions and do Conditions vary by the type of 
Attack? 
The researcher determined how each experimental condition for each type of attack 
was applied against the wireless honeypot. These were described in the research 
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design through the rings of deception in depth, the way in which the deception would 
be deployed, and any random variables that may distort the results. 
8.3.1 Conditions for FakeAP attacks 
The first Round of testing utilised Kismet and Netstumbler wireless sniffing tools for 
attacking ring one of the deception, FakeAP. The experimental research design 
identified the conditions for attack. This included the configurations of the attacking 
machine, and the FakeAP configurations. These conditions were chosen to test if the 
deceptions on FakeAP would fool the wireless sniffing tools used. The results 
demonstrated that FakeAP was able to mimic a real AP and thus, was able to fool the 
attack tools used. 
The results from FakeAP testing on the wireless honeypot indicated that wireless 
sniffing of an AP is an effective attack. This may be because the wireless 
environment and the nature of the wireless tools used were conducive for AP 
sniffing. Additionally, the researcher found that some conditions may vary by the 
attack, however, they are the configurable parameters used by FakeAP. 
The conditions that may be changed on FakeAP include testing of varying: distances 
from the AP, signal strengths, and channels. These could be tested against different 
wireless sniffing tools such as Dsniff, WaveLAN, and AirMagnet. Therefore, if 
FakeAP is able to effectively mimic a real AP, other wireless sniffing-type attacks 
may be deceived in a similar way. 
8.3.2 Conditions for NMAP and Nessus attacks 
The conditions for Honeyd identified OS and network mimicry, OS vulnerabilities, 
and TCP/IP fingerspoofing as countermeasures for NMAP and Nessus wireless 
attacks. It was found that NMAP and Nessus attacks did always achieve successful 
results against Honeyd, within the wireless environment. 
NMAP and Nessus are security tools that are also utilised for attacking purposes 
through TCP/IP port scanning and probing for vulnerabilities in an OS. This type of 
attack varies from the wireless sniffing tools that were used on FakeAP. FakeAP 
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utilised the wireless medium effectively, to carry out the attacks against the wireless 
honeypot. However, NMAP and Nessus were originally designed for the wired 
network environment. 
The researcher found the nature of network packets travelling through the air may be 
a disruption to the way NMAP and Nessus scans are performed. Therefore, the 
conditions for NMAP and Nessus attacks do vary in the wireless environment. The 
conditions may be that NMAP and Nessus require a fixed medium to execute 
effective scans that are able to guess the correct OS and vulnerabilities on every 
occasion. This is likely because NMAP and Nessus rely on the packet sequencing of 
TCP/IP handshakes to determine what the OS is. Therefore, if wireless packets are 
more frequently lost, and packets are not received in the correct order, the likelihood 
of failed OS guesses may be higher. The results from the NMAP and Nessus scans 
support this possible deduction. 
Consequently, the conditions for attacks perpetrated on the wireless honeypot did 
vary by the type of attack. The researcher came to the conclusion that wireless 
sniffing tools utilise the wireless medium effectively because they are designed to 
enumerate static information on the physical layer ( of the OSI), which is the open air, 
also used by FakeAP. However, network-attacking tools such as NMAP and Nessus 
require a more reliable medium to conduct interactive and dynamic packet exchange. 
Therefore, these attacks may require a stable network layer (of the OSI) of TCP/ IP 
connectivity in order to achieve effective Honeyd attacks. 
This is usually the case with wired media. However, the wireless medium does not 
contain electromagnetic waves through rigid confines of a copper or optic cable, and 
instead, allows the data signals to disperse with abandon. Therefore, the conditions 
for NMAP and Nessus attacks varied significantly, on the stability of the software 
and the network environment. 
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9 CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION 
SUEN YEK 
This research entitled A Deception Based Framework for the Application of 
Deceptive Countermeasures in 802. 1 1  b Wireless Networks was experimental 
research aimed to improve understanding of how deceptive methods may be used in 
network defence. The researcher adopted an exploratory method for testing logical 
and technical concepts to investigate the effectiveness of deceptions deployed on a 
wireless honeypot. The results indicated how deceptions might be used as network 
countermeasures against common brute force attacks. 
The countermeasures were deployed as deception in depth on a wireless honeypot. 
This included FakeAP and Honeyd as the primary honeypot. The attacks performed 
were wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler on FakeAP, and NMAP and 
Nessus attacks on Honeyd. The deceptions deployed were mapped from a framework 
that was used to identify how, and what type of deceptions the countermeasures and 
the attacking tools may use. 
The experimental approach and exploratory investigation allowed the researcher to 
test dependent variables - DV's  (different types of deceptions), against an 
independent variable - IV (the wireless honeypot). The outcomes gave indications of 
cause and effect relationships between the IV and DV's. The researcher implemented 
a set of conditions to test the deceptions on the IV, tested the outcomes, and then 
reconfigured the IV, and tested again. 
This was to ascertain experimental outcomes to answer the research questions: 
1 .  Can a framework for deception be applied to network countermeasures to 
reduce the effectiveness of attacks? 
2. How effective is deception in a wireless honeypot used against brute force 
attacks? 
3 .  Under what conditions, and do conditions vary by the type of attack? 
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9.1.1 Evaluating the effectiveness of deceptions in a wireless honeypot 
The researcher found from the results that deceptions used on FakeAP were highly 
effective against the wireless sniffing tools Kismet and Netstumbler. However, the 
deceptions utilised by Honeyd were not effective, in all instances, against the 
network attacking tools NMAP and Nessus. 
It was determined from the results of all the attack tools used against the wireless 
honeypot, that FakeAP was able to deploy the most effective deceptions because 
FakeAP was designed for the wireless medium. The wireless sniffing tools Kismet 
and Netstumbler could be deceived because they too, were tools that utilise the 
wireless environment. 
NMAP and Nessus however, have been primarily used in a wired environment 
utilising TCP/IP connectivity at the network level. Because the network level 
becomes blurred in a wireless environment, this may have been the reason why 
Honeyd could not effectively deceive the attack tools NMAP and Nessus. Network 
packets may have been lost, or disrupted packet sequencing may have caused 
Honeyd and the attacking tools to have errors in their network communication. 
9.1.2 Evaluating the application of the framework for deception 
The researcher found the application of the framework to be highly useful for 
mapping the network countermeasures and attacks to deceptions. It gave the 
researcher a greater understanding of how each deceptive effect of masking, mimicry 
and confusing may be implemented. Furthermore, different levels of deceptive 
sophistication, active and passive states, as well as a defensive or offensive stance 
were considered to heighten understanding of the deceptive effect. 
The framework was therefore useful in determining which network countermeasures 
were more effective against the attacks. It was observed that depending on the type 
of deception, the countermeasure implemented, and the way it was deployed, 
affected the success of the deception on the attack. 
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9.1.3 Future research and investigation of deceptions 
SUENYEK 
Deceptions may be investigated further by using FakeAP and Honeyd to deploy 
deceptions identified in the framework that are more sophisticated. FakeAP may 
incorporate wireless communication between more than one AP. This would be a 
dynamic and mimicked deception for wireless sniffing tools and packet sniffers to 
intercept. 
Additionally, the deceptions deployed by Honeyd may incorporate more network and 
application level interaction, also through a dynamic and mimicked deception. This 
may be done by adding open ports, and running services to the Honeyd configuration 
file. Each service may run a script that produces a login-banner to inform the attacker 
of what service and OS is running. Additionally, a PERL script may be called for 
other front-end applications, such as a web page. This may give additional richness 
to the deception to a would-be attacker as a secondary step after using NMAP and 
Nessus. 
The investigation may still be exploratory, although a field type study would be 
adopted instead. This would allow the researcher to deploy the wireless honeypot in 
an 'live' and 'open' space (not in a laboratory), to observe the attacks perpetrated in 
an uncontrolled environment. The results may give insight to how the effectiveness 
of similar deceptions deployed in this experiment, may result in a live and open 
environment. 
9.1.4 Limitations in the research 
There were several limitations within this research. The researcher had intended to 
conduct a third round of attacks. These would have incorporated single-hit buffer 
overflow attacks on the honeypot. This would yield useful results pertaining to the 
effectiveness of deceptions against stealth attacks on the wireless honeypot. 
However, the time constraint limited the researcher's ability to conduct testing 
beyond Round two. 
Additionally the researcher found that the Honeyd log files were lacking in providing 
useful network information on extended network activity. Honeyd reported when 
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packets were sent to a port, however, there was no additional information of the 
protocol activity and exchange that occurred between the attacking machine and the 
target wireless honeypot. 
However, it was the researcher's main objective to measure the effectiveness of 
deceptions used according to the results found through NMAP and Nessus scans. The 
Central Logging Structure (CLS), which was the SNORT IDS and Honeyd logs, 
were intended as a supplementary form of data collection to triangulate and verify 
the results of NMAP and Nessus. It was anticipated that the CLS would provide 
additional findings at the protocol level. This may have identified the honeypot' s 
interpretation of what was happening from the victim's perspective. Nonetheless, the 
scope of the research was to determine the level of deception achieved on tools that 
would typically be used by a script kiddie. 
Further research may use exploratory investigation to view the results from the 
victim's point of view. This may determine the victim's perspective of the level of 
deception achieved, which may then be compared to the attacker's perspective. 
9.1.5 Assessing the effectiveness of deceptions used for network defence 
The observed levels of deceptions achieved were significant for understanding how 
wireless networks may improve security. The research honeypot gave insight into the 
way deception may be effective or ineffective in a wireless environment against 
common network attacks. FakeAP demonstrated itself to be a highly effective 
deceptive tool for countering wireless sniffing tools. The Honeyd deceptions 
demonstrated inconsistent results that indicated that network-attacking tools may not 
be effectively deceived when used in a wireless environment. 
This identified to the researcher the difficulties that may arise when deploying 
network-based deceptions in a wireless environment. Based on the findings of this 
experiment, it is the researcher's deduction that the effectiveness of deceptions used 
in wireless network defence will need further investigation. 
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